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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL 
The plaintiffs and appellants are B.R. and C.R., the minor children of Kristy 
Ragsdale, deceased, and of David Ragsdale, who murdered Kristy in January 2008. 
William M. Jeffs identifies himself as Plaintiffs' conservator, prosecuting this appeal and 
the underlying lawsuit on their behalf. In this appeal, defendants-appellees assume, 
without conceding, that Mr. Jeffs has authority to prosecute this case for Plaintiffs. 
Defendants and appellees are Trina West, A.F.N.P., Hugo Rodier, M.D., and Pioneer 
Comprehensive Medical Clinic. Plaintiffs allege the existence often "John Doe" 
defendants. 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
B.R., a minor child, and C.R., a minor child, by 
and through their conservator, WILLIAM M. 
JEFFS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
TRINA WEST. A.F.N.P., HUGO RODIER, 
M.D., PIONEER COMPREHENSIVE 
MEDICAL CLINIC, and Does 1-X, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
CaseNo.20110207-SC 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES 
•k -k -k 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is Plaintiffs' appeal from a judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Denise Lindberg, dismissing their amended complaint for 
health care malpractice. The appeal was originally filed in this Court, which 
provisionally transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals. At Plaintiffs' request, this 
Court retained jurisdiction, which exists originally under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3) 
(West 2011). 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW, 
and 
ISSUE PRESERVATION 
I. Did the trial court correctly dismiss Plaintiffs' amended complaint, because 
no patient-health care provider relationship existed between Plaintiffs and the 
Defendant health care providers, and because there is no other justification to find a 
duty of care owed by Defendants to the non-patient Plaintiffs? This argument was 
raised in Defendants' motion to dismiss (R. 47-52, 302-308), and was the basis for the 
trial court's order of dismissal. (R. 391-392). 
The order of dismissal was entered under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), failure to state 
a claim for which relief may be granted. This Court's review will be de novo, affording 
no deference to the trial court. E.g., Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 
UT 29 If 10, 232 P.3d 999, 1004. Whether a duty exists, between a particular defendant 
and plaintiff, is "purely a legal issue for the court to decide," and therefore, no deference 
is owed to the trial court. E.g., Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44 f 
17-18, 215 P.3d 152, 157-158. 
II. Does Patient David Ragsdale's conviction for aggravated murder, based 
upon his guilty plea to intentionally and knowingly killing Kristy Ragsdale, now bar 
Plaintiffs, the Ragsdale children, from attempting to prove that Patient killed Kristy 
due to his prescribed medications? This argument was raised in defendants' alternative 
motion for summary judgment (R. 52-59, 308-312); the trial court rejected it (R. 392, 
copied in Br. of Appellants Appx. p. 13). Review of a summary judgment decision, under 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56, is non-deferential. E.g., Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23 f 18, 232 
P.3d486,495. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, AND RULES 
The trial court's decision was made under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted), and under Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (summary 
judgment). Each provision is copied in Appendix 1 of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, and Proceedings in the Trial Court 
In this case, Plaintiffs seek to hold the Defendant health care providers liable for a 
knowing and intentional murder that was committed by one of their patients. Plaintiffs 
are the minor children of Kristy Ragsdale, who was murdered in January 2008 by her 
estranged husband, David Ragsdale. 
Prior to the murder, David Ragsdale ("Patient") had been receiving health care 
from Defendant Trina West, A.F.N.P., an advanced family nurse practitioner ("Nurse 
West"). Codefendant Dr. Rodier was Nurse West's consulting physician; he and Nurse 
West both worked for codefendant Pioneer Clinic. (Amended Complaint, R. 19-29, 
copied in Appx. 2 of this brief.) Patient was criminally charged for killing his estranged 
wife, and eventually pled guilty to aggravated murder. In January 2009, he was 
sentenced to a term of twenty years to life at the Utah State Prison, which he is currently 
serving. (Judgment and Sentence, State v. David Ragsdale, R. 93-95.) 
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Plaintiffs were toddlers at the time of the murder. In November 2009, they 
(through their conservator) served notice of their intent to sue the Defendant health care 
providers, followed, in April 2010, by service of their amended complaint. Patient, the 
murderer, is not a plaintiff, nor did Plaintiffs name him as a codefendant. However, 
Plaintiffs' malpractice claims were wholly based upon Defendants' care of Patient, or 
failure to care for him. Plaintiffs alleged that Nurse West had improperly prescribed 
various medications for Patient. Those medications, Plaintiffs alleged, had "toxic side 
effects" that had caused Patient to kill his estranged wife, Kristy. Against codefendants 
Dr. Rodier and Pioneer Clinic, Plaintiffs alleged failure to adequately monitor Nurse 
West's care of Patient. (See Amended Complaint, R. 19-29, in Appx. 2.) 
Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on two alternative grounds. 
First, Defendants argued that they owed no duty of care toward Plaintiffs, who were not 
Defendants' patients, and therefore, Plaintiffs cannot sue Defendants for malpractice. (R. 
47-52, 302-308.) Second, relying upon the record of the criminal prosecution, 
Defendants argued that Patient's guilty plea to aggravated murder—i.e., to knowingly and 
intentionally killing his wife—bars Plaintiffs' claim that Patient killed her due to the 
influence of his medications. (R. 52-59, 308-312.) 
The trial court granted Defendants' motion on the first asserted ground. The court 
held that it was "not persuaded that, under the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, 
the non-patient plaintiffs may step into [Patient]'s shoes to pursue a malpractice lawsuit 
against the defendants." (Ruling and Order, R. 391-392, copied in Appx. 3.) The court 
4 
rejected Defendants' second argument, holding that because Plaintiffs had not been 
parties to the criminal case, nor in privity with those parties, the "issue preclusion" bar 
does not apply. (Id.) 
Plaintiffs now appeal. Asking this Court to affirm, Defendants reassert both of 
their original grounds for dismissal. 
Statement of Facts 
The parties' arguments on appeal, as in the trial court, are based upon the 
allegations in Plaintiffs' amended complaint, and also upon the record of Patient's 
criminal prosecution.1 This fact recitation is taken from both of those sources. 
1. From mid-April 2007 through December 21, 2007, Patient received health 
care from Defendant Nurse West at codefendant Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, 
where she and codefendant Dr. Rodier both worked. (Amended Complaint 112-28, R. 
21-22, in Appx. 2.) 
2. Plaintiffs do not allege that they were patients of Defendants. Patient is not 
a party to this lawsuit. (Amended Complaint, R. 19-29, in Appx. 2.) 
3. Plaintiffs do not allege that at any time, Patient was under the custody or 
control of the Defendant health care providers. (Id.) 
defendants submitted copies of the criminal prosecution record to the trial court, 
asking the court to take judicial notice of it. (R. 41, 52-53.) Plaintiffs did not object. 
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4. It is presumed true that as of December 21, 2007, Nurse West was 
prescribing seven medications for Patient, including psychotropic medications and 
steroids. (Id. Tf 30.) 
5. Plaintiffs do not allege that codefendant Dr. Rodier, nor any other Pioneer 
Clinic staff member, had any active involvement in Nurse West's prescribing decisions. 
They only allege that Dr. Rodier failed to provide certain consultation and monitoring of 
Patient's treatment by Nurse West. (Id. f 44.) 
6. It is presumed true that Nurse West learned, no later than December 21, 
2007, that Patient was having marital problems, and that his wife, Kristy, had obtained a 
"restraining order" against him. (Id. 128.) 
7. Plaintiffs allege that as of December 21, 2007, Patient "was displaying toxic 
side effects from the combination of his prescribed medications." (Id. Tf 29.) 
8. On Sunday, January 6, 2008, Patient shot his estranged wife, Kristy 
Ragsdale, multiple times in a church parking lot, in front of several witnesses. She died 
at the scene. (Id. If 31.) 
9. Within two hours of the shooting, Patient turned himself in to police. (Id. f 
32.) At that time, he did not discuss the case, but invoked his "Miranda" rights and 
retained counsel. (Tr. criminal sentencing, R. 157-159, in Appx. 6.) 
10. It is presumed true that a blood sample, apparently taken from Patient after 
his arrest, showed that his medications were within prescribed ranges, with no illicit 
substances detected. (Amended Complaint f 33.) 
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11. By criminal information dated January 28, 2008, Patient was charged with 
aggravated murder, death penalty-eligible, and with two counts of domestic violence in 
the presence of a child.2 (Criminal docket, R. 63, State v. Ragsdale, Utah Fourth Judicial 
District No. 081400235, copied in Appx.4; criminal information, R. 80-81.) 
12. Patient was initially represented by criminal defense attorney Gregory 
Skordas. (Criminal docket entries 1/28/08 through 7/9/08, R. 65-73, in Appx. 4.) 
13. On one occasion, attorney Skordas obtained a continuation of the criminal 
prosecution, to complete a doctor's evaluation of Patient. (Tr. of 3/5/08 criminal hearing, 
R. 123.) 
14. Patient's criminal preliminary hearing was held on June 2, 2008, before 
Fourth District Judge Laycock, who ordered him bound over for trial. (Criminal docket 
sheet, R. 69-72, in Appx. 4.) 
15. Several weeks later, attorney Skordas withdrew as Patient's counsel; 
attorneys from the Utah County Public Defender Association then entered their 
appearance as Patient's counsel. (Id., R. 72-73.) 
16. On November 26, 2008, Patient appeared in court, again before Judge 
Laycock. At that time, he pleaded guilty to aggravated murder, Count I of the criminal 
information, a first degree felony. Counts II and III were dismissed. (Tr. of change-of-
plea hearing, R. 127-153, copied in Appx. 5.) 
2The children involved were not Plaintiffs; they were children of another family 
going to the same church when Kristy was murdered. (Tr. plea hearing, R. 151, Appx. 5.) 
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17. Before the court accepted Patient's guilty plea, his attorney, Mr. Kawai, 
described the efforts made by the defense. "We retained a mitigation expert who's been 
doing mitigation research into the Ragsdale matter. Also a psychologist and a factual 
expert . . . ." (Id., R. 130.) 
18. Attorney Kawai added that the guilty plea was the product of negotiations 
that included the involvement of Kristy Ragsdale's parents, Mr. and Mrs. Palizzi. (Id., R. 
130, 132.) The prosecutor confirmed that via Mrs. Palizzi, Kristy's family had discussed 
and approved the proposed plea. (Id., R. 133-134.) 
19. The guilty plea was supported by a written "Statement of Defendant in 
Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel." That "plea statement," signed by 
Patient, recited the elements of aggravated murder as follows: 
On or about January 6, 2008; 
in Utah County; 
I intentionally or knowingly; 
caused the death of another; 
under circumstances creating a great risk of death to a person other than the 
victim and the actor. 
(Plea statement, R. 84, emphasis added.) 
20. The plea statement included Patient's affirmation that he was entering the 
guilty plea voluntarily, with the assistance of counsel, with awareness of the rights that he 
was thereby waiving, and with awareness of the consequences of his guilty plea. (Id., R. 
84-88.) 
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21. The plea statement included affirmations, from defense counsel and from 
the prosecutor, to the effect that the representations made therein, by Patient, were 
accurate. (Id., R. 89-90.) 
22. Judge Laycock conducted a "plea colloquy" with Patient, his counsel, and 
the prosecutor, including inquiries into the factual bases for the plea, the rights he was 
waiving by pleading guilty, and the punishment for the murder. (Tr. change-of-plea 
hearing, R. 132-149, 151-152, in Appx. 5.) 
23. Following the above-summarized colloquy, Judge Laycock entered an 
Order accepting Patient's guilty plea, finding that the plea was "freely, knowingly, and 
voluntarily made." (Plea statement, R. 91.) 
24. Patient's sentencing hearing, in January 2009, was held before Judge 
Laycock. Patient's attorney, Mr. Kawai, commented as follows on the question whether 
Patient's medications had played a part in the murder: 
Your honor, there has been talk of the medication that he was on. We 
had Dr. Pablo Stewart do evaluations of that medication, and it is his 
medical opinion that the high dosages of the multiple medications that 
he was on that day greatly contributed to that. That's not a legal 
defense; there were no legal defenses that we could make because of 
that information. It's not an excuse for his actions. Many people are on 
high dosages of medication and they don't do the horrible acts that 
David did. But I look at what happened on the 6th of January, 2008 and 
it just seems like there was a storm brewing, that storm was exacerbated 
by the medications that David was on, and it's just a tragedy as to what 
happened. 
(Tr. sentencing hearing, R. 175-176, copied in Appx. 6.) 
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25. In his comments at sentencing, Patient claimed that he would not have 
murdered Kristy but for his medications, yet acknowledged that he was accepting "full 
responsibility" for the murder. (Id., R. 177.) 
26. At the sentencing hearing, Kristy Ragsdale's parents, Mr. and Mrs. Palizzi, 
appeared. Mrs. Palizzi (who had been an eyewitness to the murder) spoke for the 
Ragsdale children, who are now Plaintiffs in this civil lawsuit. From her comments, and 
those of Judge Laycock, it is apparent that Mr. and Mrs. Palizzi have assumed parental 
responsibility for Plaintiffs. Mrs. Palizzi expressed no criticism of the handling of the 
criminal prosecution, attributed Patient's crime to "selfishness," and expressed gratitude 
toward the court, the prosecutors, and the community. (Id., R. 178-187, 200-201, in 
Appx. 6.) 
27. Before pronouncing sentence, Judge Laycock made the following 
observations: 
This was literally one moment of incalculable cruelty and selfishness on 
Mr. Ragsdale's part. 
I understand the claims about the various psychotropic drugs that 
[Patient] was prescribed and using, but as I view the evidence from the 
preliminary hearing, and what I've heard today that gave me added 
detail that I didn't even get at that hearing, it's very clear to me that 
regardless of whatever prescription drugs he was taking, he knew very 
well what he was doing. 
The testimony was from several people that they saw him sitting in his 
BMW on the south side of the church, as I recall it was the south side of 
the church, and they passed him. They saw the car. It's veiy clear to 
me he was there. He waited until he saw his wife drive past. From the 
vantage point he would certainly have known that his mother-in-law was 
in the car with her. He watched them drive past. He went into the 
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parking lot of the church. He went around until he found them. It didn't 
take long. He stepped out of the car and without a word, in probably 
less than a minute, emptied the gun into his wife. I am convinced he 
knew exactly what he was doing. 
Now, whether or not he was taking drugs, whether or not he planned this 
for a day or for a half hour, he understood exactly what he was doing. 
He may not have understood all the ramifications and how it would hurt 
all the people that have spoken to me and the countless others who have 
not spoken to me today, but he knew what he was doing. 
(Id., R. 201,203-204.) The sentence was twenty years to life. (Id., R. 205.) 
28. Patient, David Ragsdale, has never moved to withdraw his guilty plea, nor 
has he appealed or otherwise challenged his conviction for aggravated murder. (Criminal 
docket, R. 63-78, in Appx. 4.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. This Court should affirm the trial court's judgment that, under the facts of this 
case, the Defendant health care providers owed no duty of care to the non-patient 
Plaintiffs. That judgment is well-supported by this Court's case law that limits health 
care provider liability, to non-patients who have been injured by patients, to instances 
wherein the patient is either under the "custody or control" of, or in a "special 
relationship" with the care provider. Such relationships arise only when the patient 
should be recognized to be "uniquely dangerous," a situation not present in this case. If 
allowed to proceed, Plaintiffs' claim would inappropriately expand malpractice risks for 
health care providers, and would actually chill the provision of needed health care. The 
judgment of dismissal was also proper under the "generic" duty analysis urged by 
Plaintiffs, accounting for the health care context of this case. 
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II. Alternatively or additionally, the judgment of dismissal may be affirmed upon 
the ground rejected by the trial court—that Patient's guilty plea to intentionally killing his 
estranged wife conclusively excludes Plaintiffs' proposed civil claim that he killed her 
under the influence of his prescription medications. A restrictive application of issue 
preclusion would seemingly prohibit this defense. However, application of the doctrine 
in light of its underpinning policies, particularly judicial economy and integrity, should 
bar Plaintiffs, who approved the guilty plea, from re-litigating the question whether 
Patient's medication caused him, to any degree, to murder his wife. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction and Issue Clarification 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants are liable for the allegedly negligent prescribing of 
certain medications for Patient. Those medications, they allege, caused Patient to shoot 
his estranged wife, Kristy Ragsdale. So vehemently do Plaintiffs assert this, that they 
demand punitive damages (Amended Complaint, R. 28, in Appx. 2)—as if Defendants 
themselves had committed the murder. 
It is agreed that Patient, if he chose to do so, could prosecute that "negligent 
prescribing" claim (although on the particular facts, he would be barred, as explained in 
Point II). It is agreed that if Patient had died from the allegedly negligently-prescribed 
medications, Plaintiffs, as his heirs, would have a claim for wrongful death under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-3-106 (West 2011). In other words, it is agreed that Defendants, or at 
least Nurse West, had a duty toward Patient. 
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But Patient is not a party to this case. Patient is alive. He is believed to be 
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, from where he has access to the Utah state courts. 
It is unknown whether Patient is even aware of Plaintiffs' lawsuit. 
For Plaintiffs' lawsuit to proceed, they must show that they, as non-patients, may 
assert the "negligent prescribing" theory that normally could be asserted only by Patient 
(or his survivors, if Patient had died from the alleged malpractice). The trial court held 
that under the facts of the case, Plaintiffs cannot "step into Patient's shoes" to pursue such 
a claim. In effect, the trial court held that Defendants had no duty of care toward the non-
patient Plaintiffs. As shown in the argument points that follow, the trial court's holding 
was proper on a number of grounds. 
Plaintiffs assert that the trial court applied a blanket "only the patient may sue" 
rule. (Br. of Appellants pp. 3, 6-7, 12-13.) The court's comments do reveal its concern 
that Patient is not a party to this case. (Tr. Mot. to Dismiss, R. 415 p. 32-33.) However, 
in their motion papers, all parties addressed the question whether this case falls within an 
exception to that general rule. (R. 48-52, 253-265, 285-291.) A good way to address this 
case is to begin with a presumption that only the patient may sue the provider, and then 
decide whether the case falls within a legitimate exception to such presumption. As 
argued herein, this case falls within no such exception. 
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POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS WERE CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
BECAUSE UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE HEALTH CARE 
PROVIDERS HAD NO DUTY TO THE NON-PATIENT PLAINTIFFS 
A 
Because Patient Was Not In Defendants' Custody or Control, 
Nor Otherwise in a "Special Relationship" with Defendants, 
Defendants Owed No Duty Toward Plaintiffs. 
1. Health Care Cases Provide Primary Guidance, 
This Court has acknowledged "confusing cross-currents of tort law" on the 
question of when a particular defendant may owe a duty toward a particular plaintiff. 
Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 2005 UT 80 % 7, 125 P.3d 906, 908. Those currents have been 
swirling since Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). From 
those cross-currents, Plaintiffs in this case extract various judicial statements that, isolated 
from their contexts, would seemingly support Plaintiffs5 argument that the Defendant 
health care providers owed a duty toward Ihem. Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs' 
approach because there is prominent Utah case law that deals much more directly with the 
context of this case. 
That case law is related to health care—particularly, mental health care. This 
Court has decided three significant cases wherein mental health patients injured non-
patients. The injured non-patients then sued the care providers for malpractice. The 
cases are Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416 (Utah 1998), Higgins v. Salt Lake 
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County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993), and Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991).4 
In all three cases, the non-patients' claims were barred, either for lack of duty {Wilson, 
Rollins), or based upon governmental immunity {Higgins). All three cases contain 
significant discussion about when a duty may exist to non-patients.5 
Obviously, this Court's mental health cases arise from factual contexts that are 
quite similar to this case. The policies articulated in these cases also apply to this case. 
Accordingly, Defendants herein base their argument, for affirmance of the trial court's 
judgment, primarily upon these cases. Defendants will also address Plaintiffs' more 
"generic" arguments, but not until after our arguments within the health care context. 
2. No "Custody or Control, " Nor Other "Special Relationship. " 
In a footnote to Young v. Salt Lake City School District, 2002 UT 64, 52 P.3d 
1230, this Court explained a significant element of its mental health cases— Wilson, 
Higgins, and Rollins. Those cases, the Court explained, along with Beach v. University of 
Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986), "clearly demonstrate that control over, or custody of, the 
4Utah has a statutory "duty to protect" law that applies to mental health therapists. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-502(l) (West 2011). Because Defendants in this case are not 
"therapists," their potential "duty to protect" is broader than Utah's statutory duty, and is 
governed by this Court's case law. Wilson, 969 P.2d at 420, 421. 
5Plaintiffs state that in Higgins, "this Court permitted a claim against [care 
providers] by the victim of an attack by a mental patient." (Br. of Appellants p. 11). This 
Court did not permit that claim to proceed, ultimately holding that it was barred by 
governmental immunity. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240-241. Plaintiffs also assert that in 
Higgins, "the fact that the victim was not the defendant's patient was not even an issue." 
(Br. of Appellants p. 11.) That fact was a central issue in that portion of Higgins wherein 
this Court stated, in what effectively was dictum, that a duty could exist, based on certain 
alleged facts, between defendants and the non-patient victim, 855 P.2d at 234-240. 
15 
primary person who caused the injury is a necessary prerequisite before engaging in a 
foreseeability of harm analysis." Young, 2002 UT 64117 n.7, 52 P.3d at 1234 n.7 
(emphasis added). Subsequently, in Doe v. Corporation of the President of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2004 UT App 274, 98 P.3d 429, the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that the LDS Church had no duty to protect children, in an LDS stake, from 
alleged sexual abuse by an LDS High Priest. No duty existed because neither the High 
Priest nor the children were in the Church's "custody or control" at the time of the alleged 
abuse. 2004 UT App 274 ffif 11-14, 98 P.3d at 431-433. 
In this case, Plaintiffs neither allege nor suggest that Patient was ever in 
Defendants' "custody or control." He was not in court-ordered treatment; nor was he 
otherwise under Defendants' physical or legal control. Compare Young, 2002 UT 64 f 
14, 52 P.3d at 1233 (student may be in elementary school's "custody or control" during 
normal school hours). He was a voluntary, adult patient, receiving care at an outpatient 
clinic. Therefore, read at face value, Young and Doe justify the dismissal of Plaintiffs' 
claims. 
Granted, Young and Doe did not arise in a health care context. The patient in 
Higgins, a health care case, had not been in the care providers' custody or control when 
she stabbed the non-patient plaintiff. In Higgins, this Court stated that "legal ability to 
control" the patient is "only one factor to consider" in deciding whether a duty could exist 
to a non-patient. 855 P.2d at 237 n.5. The ultimate inquiry is whether the care provider-
patient relationship is so "special" that it creates a duty toward one or more non-patients. 
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Id. In fact, this Court's analysis in Young, along with the court of appeals' analysis in 
Doe, were founded not solely upon "custody or control," but also upon the closely related 
question whether a "special relationship" existed. Young, 2002 UT 64 f 14, 52 P.3d at 
1233; Doe, 2004 UT App 110-12, 98 P.3d at 431-432. 
In this case, no such "special relationship" is apparent. Besides no inkling of 
"custody or control," there is nothing else in the relationship between Patient and 
Defendants that is sufficiently "special" to impose a duty, upon Defendants, toward 
Plaintiffs. This Court has rejected the argument that such "special relationship" arises in 
every care provider-patient relationship. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 238. Instead, the primary 
"special relationship" consideration, in this context, is whether the patient "has shown 
him- or herself to be uniquely dangerous" to others. Id. at 237. This means that the 
patient is "likely" to cause bodily harm to a non-patient. Id. at 238. "[T]he term is 
'likely' to cause, not 'might' cause." Id., citing Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162. 
Plaintiffs in this case allege nothing to show that Patient was "uniquely 
dangerous," and "likely" to physically harm others, while under Defendants' care. They 
vaguely allege that on December 21, 2007, over two weeks before the murder, Patient 
was experiencing unspecified "toxic side effects" from his medications. (Amended 
Complaint, R. 22.)6 Virtually every medication, including common nonprescription 
medications, can have "toxic side effects." These could mean anything from a skin rash, 
defendants dispute that allegation, but acknowledge that it, like other factual 
allegations in this case, may be presumed true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. 
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to constipation, to sudden cardiac arrest. The term is useless in helping to decide whether 
Patient was "uniquely dangerous." 
Plaintiffs also allege that on that same date, two weeks before the murder, Patient 
acknowledged marital problems to Nurse West, and reported that a "restraining order had 
been entered against him" by his estranged wife. (Id.) Such allegations also would not 
support a duty toward Plaintiffs, nor toward the wife. "Marital problems," which are 
common, surely do not make a patient "uniquely dangerous" to anybody. And a 
"restraining order" would not change Defendants' duty. This Court is "loath to recognize 
a duty that is realistically incapable of performance or fundamentally at odds with the 
nature of the parties' relationship." Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237. The restraining order did 
not convert the Defendant care providers into law enforcement officers. 
Furthermore, existence of a restraining order was not a "symptom." This Court 
has stated that a health care provider is not required to "take measures not otherwise 
indicated by the apparent symptoms of the patient" Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240 n.7 
(emphasis added). Plaintiffs make no allegation that Patient showed symptoms, or made 
any statements, to show that he was likely to violate the restraining order. Thus existence 
of the restraining order also does not show that Patient had become "likely" to injure 
someone, or had otherwise become "uniquely dangerous." It was equally or more likely 
that the restraining order would serve its intended function of keeping Patient away from 
his estranged wife. In any event, the restraining order was a law enforcement issue, not a 
clinical symptom that Patient was likely to attack his wife. 
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Plaintiffs argue that because Patient's estranged wife was an individually-
identifiable non-patient potential victim, Defendants had a duty toward her. They draw 
that argument from various cases where that distinction has been made, in deciding 
whether a duty is owed. However, under Rollins and Higgins, even if an individual 
potential victim is known, the patient must still be "uniquely dangerous" in order for the 
care provider to owe a duty to that potential victim. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240 (citing 
Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162). Because Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to show that 
Patient was likely to harm his estranged wife, it does not matter whether she was an 
"identifiable" potential victim. 
3. "Foreseeability" in Health Care Context. 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to presume the truth of their allegation that the murder was 
a "foreseeable" result of the alleged negligent treatment. (Br. of Appellants p. 20-21.) 
They implicitly invoke traditional Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) analysis, under which well-
pleaded factual allegations are presumed to be true. That approach is wrong in this case, 
for two reasons. 
First, under Young and this Court's mental health cases, Plaintiffs' "foreseeability" 
allegations are not relevant. The "necessary prerequisite" of "custody or control," or an 
otherwise "special" care provider-patient relationship, has not been established. 
Therefore, under Young, 2002 UT 64 f 17 n.7, 52 P.3d at 1234 n.7, no "foreseeability of 
harm" analysis is done. 
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Second, in the health care context of this case, "foreseeability" is properly 
encompassed within the "special relationship" analysis. A provider-patient relationship 
may become "special," and give rise to a duty toward non-patients, when the patient is 
dangerous and "likely" to harm others. Thus the "special relationship" analysis plainly 
includes "foreseeability." 
Dangerous behavior is difficult to foresee, because of the "empirically 
demonstrated inability of trained healthcare professionals to reliably predict future 
dangerousness . . . . " Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235. In other words, as a matter of science, 
Patient's crime (or his "violent outburst," as Plaintiffs call it) was not foreseeable—at 
least not on the facts alleged by Plaintiffs. Compare Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240 (duty could 
exist to non-patient victim, "if reasonable action would have revealed that [patient] was 
likely to inflict grievous bodily harm on [victim]"). As stated by another court: "Unless a 
patient makes specific threats, the possibility that he may inflict injury on another is 
vague, speculative, and a matter of conjecture." Brady v. Hopper, 570 F.Supp. 1333, 
1338 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984). In other words, for violent 
behavior to become "foreseeable," given the scientific limits of predictive ability, the 
patient must manifest clear warnings of dangerousness. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs' "foreseeability" allegations are not merely owed no 
presumption of correctness: they fail. Neither the allegedly mis-prescribed medications, 
nor the "marital problems," nor the "restraining order," individually or together, made 
Patient likely to harm others, known or unknown. His relationship with Defendants did 
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not change to one that was sufficiently "special" to create a duty running from Defendants 
to the non-patient Plaintiffs. 
4. Policy Considerations Against Plaintiffs' Claims. 
This Court's mental health case law is consistent with important policies that limit 
the circumstances under which a health care provider may have a duty toward a non-
patient. Most prominently, there is a policy permitting people to receive health care in a 
confidential, supportive setting. Care provider duties to non-patients are limited, in order 
to "protect[] the traditional confidentiality of the provider/patient relationship, which is 
important both for privacy reasons and for the efficacy of the therapeutic relationship." 
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 239. 
The importance of such confidentiality is highlighted in Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2008 
UT 8, 177 P.3d 614. In Sorensen, this Court held that the health care duty of 
confidentiality is "fiduciary," commanding loyalty to the patient: 
A physician's duty of confidentiality encompasses the broad principle that 
prohibits a physician from disclosing information received through the 
physician-patient relationship. The duty is rooted in the ethical 
underpinnings of this relationship and serves to prevent a physician from 
disclosing sensitive medical information to any third party. It arises from 
the understanding that good medical care requires a patient's trust and 
confidence that disclosures to physicians will be used solely for the 
patient's welfare and that a patient's privacy with regard to those 
disclosures will be respected and protected. 
2008 UT 8 f 12, 177 P.3d at 617. Consistent with the above-enunciated principles, this 
Court's mental health law permits breach of patient trust, and action to protect a non-
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patient's interest, only when the patient is "uniquely dangerous," giving rise to a serious 
safety concern. 
In their attempt to avoid this Court's mental health case law and its related 
policies, Plaintiffs in this case disclaim any "failure to protect" theory. They told the trial 
court: "The Complaint here has nothing to do with a duty to warn or to provide 
protection. Rather, the claim is that Defendants' negligence caused the patient to become 
violent." (R. 264, Opp. to Motion to Dismiss, emphasis added.) On appeal, Plaintiffs 
similarly disclaim any such theory, asserting that it would impose an unwarranted "extra 
responsibility" upon health care providers. (Br. of Appellants p. 9.) The only duty they 
impose here, Plaintiffs assert, is the duty to "choose a medically acceptable course of 
treatment." (Id.) 
Defendants repeat: Any duty was owed to Patient, it was not owed to Plaintiffs. 
While Plaintiffs may not be attempting to impose any extra duty upon health care 
providers, they certainly are attempting to impose substantial extra liability risk. 
Plaintiffs' theory, if accepted, would improperly open every treatment decision to 
challenge from non-patients, any time that the patient allegedly harms someone. Every 
treatment decision would be made under such cloud of uncertainty. Care providers' 
loyalty to their patients would be eroded by concerns that malpractice might be alleged by 
some non-patient(s). Under Plaintiffs' theory, a non-patient could sue a care provider for 
"negligent prescribing" even if the patient is satisfied with the care. 
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That theory violates settled legal policy. Besides judicial policy commanding 
primary loyalty to the patient, Utah's legislature has placed limits upon health care 
malpractice liability. Utah's Health Care Malpractice Act expresses the policy concerns 
as follows: 
The Legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for 
damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health 
care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases the 
insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical 
malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and 
increased claims is increased health care cost, both through the health care 
providers passing the cost of premiums to the patient and through the 
provider's practicing defensive medicine because he views a patient as a 
potential adversary in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are 
discouraged from continuing to provide services because of the high cost 
and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-402(l) (West 2011) (full statute copied in Appx. 1). 
This Court has criticized, to varying degrees, the above-quoted legislative 
statement. E.g., Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 584-588 (Utah 1993); Juddv. Drezga, 2004 
UT 91 Tf 45-49, 103 P.3d 135, 147-148 (Durham, J , dissenting, joined by Nehring, J.). 
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' theory in this case, if endorsed, would multiply the difficulties 
that the Health Care Malpractice Act is designed to limit. Under Plaintiffs' theory, a 
health care provider would face not only the risk that his or her patient will be a "potential 
adversary in a lawsuit." The provider would also face a risk that any >?6w-patient, critical 
of the patient's care, and claiming to be harmed by the patient, would be a potential 
litigation adversary. Such non-patient adversary would not even need the actual patient's 
support or involvement—which is the posture of this case. 
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The Utah legislature and this Court have crafted carefully circumscribed situations 
in which a health care provider may become liable to a non-patient. Legislatively, actions 
for wrongful death and for loss of consortium have been created. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78B-3-106 (wrongful death), 30-2-11 (loss of consortium) (West 2011). These are 
subject to their own limitations, and to the limitations and policies embodied in the Health 
Care Malpractice Act. Case law, as explained, limits other such actions to situations 
wherein the patient has become "uniquely dangerous," giving rise to a duty to protect 
non-patients. 
Plaintiffs' "negligent prescribing" claim in this case, untethered by any "duty to 
protect" limitation, would plainly violate such settled judicial and legislative policy. It 
would improperly intrude upon the care provider-patient relationship when, as in this 
case, the patient has brought no such claim. Because of this, Plaintiffs' claims in this case 
should be rejected. 
5. No "Negligent Prescribing" Claims for Non-Patients, 
Plaintiffs cite no Utah case wherein a non-patient has been permitted to pursue a 
"negligent prescribing" claim against a health care provider, unconnected to a "duty to 
protect," under circumstances similar to this case. Defendants can find no such case. 
Instead, it appears that when such claims are made, this Court analyzes them within the 
"special relationship" and "duty to protect" framework. Such was the case in Wilson, 
wherein this Court recited that plaintiffs alleged only negligent failure to "properly 
treat[]" the patient, 969 P.2d at 417; the Court analyzed that claim under a "duty to 
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protect" framework, id at 418-420. 
The non-Utah case most analogous to this one appears to be Webb v. Jarvis, 575 
N.E.2d 992 (Indiana 1991), a case that rejected a "negligent prescribing" claim with no 
apparent "duty to protect" component. Webb v. Jarvis involved a physician who 
allegedly mis-prescribed anabolic steroids for his patient. The patient got into a dispute 
with his wife, during which he shot and wounded the wife's brother-in-law, who was 
trying to protect her. 
The wounded brother-in-law sued the doctor. He alleged that the steroids had 
turned the patient "into a toxic psychotic who was unable to control his rages." 575 
N.E.2d at 994. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the doctor had no duty toward the 
non-patient brother-in-law, and ordered summary judgment for the doctor. While 
applying a multi-factor analysis, the Indiana Supreme Court's holding is significant for 
the "public policy" factor, which "weigh[ed] heavily against" a duty to the non-patient. 
Specifically, the court declined to erode a physician's loyalty to the patient, by imposing a 
conflicting duty toward "unknown persons." 575 N.E.2d at 997. It also held that "the 
social utility derived from prescription medication can hardly be disputed and far 
outweighs the risk of harm to third parties." Id 
Plaintiffs here may try to distinguish Webb v. Jarvis on the basis of the non-patient 
being an "unknown" potential victim. But as already explained, that distinction does not 
matter under this Court's mental health law, wherein a patient must be "uniquely 
dangerous" before a duty may arise to a known or unknown potential victim. 
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Furthermore, in Webb v. Jarvis, the non-patient was a member of the "known" victim's 
family, trying to protect the "known" victim. As such, he was a "foreseeable victim" of 
the patient's criminal conduct, to the same degree as Plaintiffs in this case, who are the 
murder victim's children. 
Webb v. Jarvis is also significant for its analysis of "foreseeability," which under 
Utah mental health law is encompassed within "special relationship" analysis and the 
prediction of dangerousness. "The causal connection between the use of steroids and 
violent behavior, if any, is simply not as well-established as are the physical effects of 
ingesting alcohol." 575 N.E.2d at 997. Thus the Indiana Supreme Court granted no 
presumption of correctness to the plaintiffs allegation that steroid medications made the 
patient dangerous. 
Another instructive, albeit less similar, situation was presented in Lester v. Hall, 
126 N.M. 404, 970 P.2d 590 (1998). In Lester, the defendant physician prescribed 
lithium for the patient. Subsequently, the patient caused an automobile accident, injuring 
a non-patient. 
The injured non-patient sued the physician for malpractice, alleging that the 
physician had negligently prescribed the lithium, specifically by failing to properly 
monitor the patient's blood lithium level, and that the physician had failed to warn the 
patient that the lithium might impair his ability to drive. 970 P.2d at 591. The New 
Mexico Supreme Court held that under those alleged facts, the defendant physician had 
no duty of care to the non-patient. 
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The New Mexico Supreme Court, similar to the Indiana court in Webb v. Jarvis, 
found no foreseeability that the allegedly mis-prescribed lithium would cause a motor 
vehicle accident: "[T]he likelihood of injury to [plaintiff] is not foreseeable to the degree 
required in order to warrant a duty." Lester v. Hall, 970 P.2d at 592. Also, the court was 
persuaded by policy concerns to not judicially expand tort liability against health care 
providers. Such policy, the court observed, was supported by New Mexico's Medical 
Malpractice Act, which (like its Utah counterpart) expresses a legislative "judgment to 
circumscribe the malpractice liability of health care providers . . . . " 970 P.2d at 593-594. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court also observed that most "negligent prescribing" 
cases are founded not simply upon allegations of mis-prescribing per se, but rather, upon 
failure to warn of potential side effects. 970 P.2d at 596-598 (canvassing cases). Thus 
most such cases fall within the framework of this Court's mental health law: if a known 
side effect poses a known risk of danger, a "duty to protect" non-patients may arise. 
As noted earlier, Plaintiffs in this case expressly disclaim any "failure to protect" 
theory. They propose a dramatic, unprecedented expansion of health care provider 
liability. They propose that they, as non-patients, should be permitted to "step into 
Patient's shoes" to pursue a "negligent prescribing" theory, divorced from any theory of 
"failure to protect," and divorced from any other established exception to the usual rule 
that only the patient may sue the care provider. Based upon sound precedent and policy, 
this Court should affirm the trial court's decision that Plaintiffs may not so proceed. 
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B 
The Generic "Normandeau" Analysis Does Not 
Support Plaintiffs' Claims. 
Plaintiffs urge application of a "generic" analysis, for existence of a duty, 
announced in Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc. (^'Normandeau IF), 2009 UT 44, 
215 P.3d 152. (Br. of Appellants p. 19-25.) Normandeau involved an allegedly negligent 
repair to a truck. The repaired component explosively failed, killing a tow truck driver. 
2009 UT 44 f 2, 215 P.3d at 154-155. Obviously, the factual context of Normandeau is 
far removed from this health care case. 
The Normandeau "duty" analysis does provide a framework to address some of 
Plaintiffs' arguments not already addressed herein. It also permits brief reiteration of 
some points already made. The Normandeau duty analysis looks at the following factors: 
(1) the legal relationship between the parties; (2) foreseeability of injury; (3) likelihood of 
injury; (4) public policy as to "which party can best bear the loss;" and (5) "other general 
policy considerations." Normandeau II, 2009 UT 44 f 19, 215 P.3d at 158. While 
Defendants urge reconsideration of the fourth factor, these factors otherwise support the 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims. 
1. Legal Relationship Between the Parties. 
As explained earlier, health care providers have a strong duty of loyalty to their 
patients. That duty cannot be breached, in the interests of non-patients, unless the patient 
clearly shows that he or she is likely to harm others. In this case, the Defendant health 
care providers were prohibited from subverting Patient's interests to those of any non-
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patient(s). If anything, under the "marital discord" circumstances alleged by Plaintiffs, 
Defendants had a heightened duty toward Patient—to support him, emotionally and 
confidentially, when his wife no longer could or would do so. 
In conclusory fashion, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants had a duty toward them, as 
"the family of the patient being treated." (Br. of Appellants p. 20.) They offer no 
analysis, and no law, to explain why that family relationship, with Patient, should trump 
Defendant's judicially-protected loyalty to Patient. 
Plaintiffs elsewhere argue that no "special relationship" analysis is appropriate in 
this case. They cite this Court's effort, in Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, 125 
P.3d 906, to clarify the "special relationship" concept. (Br. of Appellants p. 15-19.) 
Webb v. University of Utah was a slip-and-fall case, not a health care malpractice case. 
Whatever merit Plaintiffs' argument might have in a non-health care context, such 
is lacking in this case. As previously explained, this Court's mental health cases plainly 
require that for a health care provider to be liable to a non-patient, for harm inflicted by 
the patient, the patient must be in a "special relationship" with, or in the "custody or 
control" of, the care provider. "Special relationship" analysis figured prominently in 
Wilson, 969 P.2d at 419-420, Higgins, 855 P.2d at 236-237, and Rollins, 813 P.2d at 
1159-1161. There is no indication that Webb v. University of Utah overrules these cases, 
or even undercuts them, to any degree. 
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2. Foreseeability of Injury. 
This Court has stated that "foreseeability," in assessing duty, inquires whether a 
"reasonable person" could foresee a likelihood that harm will be caused by particular 
conduct. AMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315, 321 
(Utah 1997). The "reasonable person" approach is a court function. Normandeau 
involved a defective truck repair that, as a matter of physics, created a specific, 
mechanically predictable, physical safety hazard. Cruz v. MiddlekauffLincoln-Mercury, 
909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996), also cited by Plaintiffs, involved a car dealership that 
repeatedly left keys in its automobiles—increasing theft risk, as a matter of common 
sense. As such, "foreseeability" in those cases was straightforward from a "reasonable 
person" perspective. 
Certain health care situations, hypothesized by Plaintiffs, do foreseeably pose 
hazards, and concomitant duties, to non-patients. (Br. of Appellants pp. 14-15, 20.) 
Administering sedative or narcotic medications, and then allowing the patient to drive 
while in an impaired state, presents a readily understood and well-known safety risk. 
E.g., Lester v. Hall, 970 P.2d at 592 (lithium does not present equivalent safety risk as 
narcotic injection). Improper care and counseling of a patient who has an infectious 
disease could also foreseeably harm non-patients, such that a duty could extend to them. 
In such situations, established and well-known concepts of pharmacology and infectious 
disease may support foreseeability. 
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Those situations are not analogous to this case. In Higgins, this Court flatly 
rejected the non-patient plaintiffs argument that an infectious disease is analogous to 
mental illness. 855 P.2d at 236 n.4. Higgins defeats Plaintiffs' effort, in this case, to 
make that same analogy. (Br. of Appellants p. 14-15.) 
This case involves highly complex and incompletely understood possible 
interactions of pharmacology, general human behavior, personality traits, and troubled 
marital relationships. Over two weeks elapsed between Patient's last visit to Nurse West 
and the murder. In Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d at 997, arising from strikingly similar 
circumstances, the Indiana Supreme Court found no "foreseeability" in a case alleging 
improper prescription of anabolic steroids. Based upon the allegations in this lawsuit, to 
hold that Defendants should have foreseen Patient's intentional crime, as a result of his 
medications, would be to improperly hold Defendants to a duty of clairvoyance. No 
reasonable person would impose such duty; neither should this Court. 
3. Likelihood of Injury, 
This Normandeau factor appears to overlap the "foreseeability" factor. Plaintiffs 
allege that Patient shot his estranged wife after he had been taking his medications for 
over five months; the last dosage adjustment was over two weeks before the murder. 
(Amended Complaint, R. 22-23.) Cf. Lester v. Hall, 970 P.2d at 592-593 (physician did 
not have duty to non-patient, where the accident caused by patient occurred five days 
after last physician visit). Plaintiffs' vague allegations of "toxic side effects" from 
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medications, "marital difficulties" and a "restraining order," as already argued, did not 
make the murder of his estranged wife foreseeable; nor did it make that tragedy likely. 
That a tragedy occurred cannot be denied. But the likelihood of such tragedy, 
given the uneventful course of Patient's treatment before the murder, was extremely 
remote. Defendants' duty should not be assessed by hindsight. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 236 
("hindsight bias" must be avoided in assessing duty). 
4. Public Policy as to "Which Party Can Best Bear the Loss. " 
Before the trial court, Plaintiffs applied this factor as follows: "Defendants and 
their insurers are better situated to bear the cost of this loss." (R. 255.) Of course, not all 
health care providers are wealthy, and some do not carry malpractice insurance. In any 
event, this Normandeau factor appears to be of questionable origin. Accordingly, 
Defendants ask this Court to reconsider it. 
In Normandeau II, this Court seemingly cited the following passage, from AMS 
Salt Industries, for the proposition that consideration of "who can best bear the loss" is 
another factor in determining duty: 
Whether the law imposes a duty does not depend upon foreseeability alone. 
The likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it 
and the consequences of placing that burden upon defendant, must also be 
taken into account.... A duty may also be found on the basis of reasonable 
mutual reliance, voluntary conduct which increases the risk of harm, and 
general policy considerations. 
7On appeal, Plaintiffs do not urge this "bear the loss" approach in the same way. 
Instead, they invoke one of their main themes, that "malfeasance" supports a duty even if 
"nonfeasance" would not. (Br. of Appellants p. 24-25.) 
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AMS Salt Industries, 942 P.2d at 321 (quoting authority, internal citations and quotations 
omitted), cited in Normandeau II, 2009 UT 44 % 19, 215 P.3d at 158. It is not clear how, 
from the just-quoted passage, the Court in Normandeau II decided that the question of 
"who can best bear the loss" is a factor in deciding duty. 
To overrule a precedent consisting of an entire case, a "substantial burden of 
persuasion" must be carried. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399-400 (Utah 1994) 
(overruling 19-year precedent about jury selection). However, this Court is more willing 
to overrule precedent that has "weak analytical underpinnings." Id. at 399-400. It is also 
willing to overrule statements that, on subsequent review, appear to be minor components 
of an otherwise sound holding, or statements that have not been thoroughly scrutinized. 
E.g., Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91 f 20-21, 173 P.3d 848, 852 (overruling a 
single paragraph, in a prior case, that appeared "almost as an afterthought"); Utahnsfor 
Better Dental Health v. Davis County Clerk, 2007 UT 97 \ 6-8, 175 P.3d 1036, 1038-
1039 (overruling a prior "standard of review" rule that had been adopted without close 
examination). Revisitation of the "bear the loss" factor, for determining duty, appears 
appropriate in this case, for similar reasons. 
Another problem with the "bear the loss" factor is that it supports the imposition of 
strict liability, without regard to actual fault, upon a party who appears to have resources 
to satisfy a judgment. The defense has found few other jurisdictions that apply a "bear 
the loss" factor to decide whether a duty exists. None of those jurisdictions seem to have 
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analyzed the "bear the loss" factor closely. Also, the "bear the loss" factor conflicts with 
Utah legislative intent regarding health care malpractice, as previously discussed. 
Accordingly, it seems appropriate for this Court to overrule the "bear the loss" factor in 
determining duty, or at least to reject it in the health care malpractice context. It should 
not be dispositive of the "duty" analysis in this case. 
5. Other General Policy Considerations. 
This open-ended "duty" factor provides an opportunity to address the non-patient 
Plaintiffs' additional reasoning as to why they should be permitted to sue the Defendant 
health care providers. Sound policy counsels against them. 
Citing Webb v. University of Utah, the slip-and-fall case, Plaintiffs highlight 
purported distinctions between "malfeasance and nonfeasance." They argue that Nurse 
West committed "malfeasance" by prescribing "improper medications," and therefore, 
*See University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 57 n.2 (Colo. 1987) ("capacity 
of the parties to bear the loss" is among various factors "that have been given conscious 
or unconscious weight by the courts"); 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. 
Finlandia Center, Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (N.Y. 2001) ("reparation allocation" as a 
factor). Indiana looks at the relationship of the parties, the foreseeability of the harm, and 
"public policy issues" generally. Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 
517 (Indiana 1994); but see Ousley v. Board of Commas of Fulton County, 734 N.E.2d 
290, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) ("bear the loss" factor included). New Mexico "carefully 
balanc[es]" the "likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, 
and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant." Lester v. Hall, 970 
P.2d at 592. Tennessee applies a seven-factor analysis, with no "bear the loss" factor. 
Satterfieldv. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.2d 347, 365 (Tenn. 2008). Without 
"privity of contract between the parties," California examines at least six factors, without 
mention of "who bears the loss." Greenberg v. Superior Court, 111 Cal.App.41 1339, 
1347, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 102 (2009). 
34 
she had a duty toward them. They imply that if she merely committed "nonfeasance," she 
would have no duty to them. (Br. of Appellants pp. 8-10, 22.) That argument, if 
accepted, provides additional reason to affirm the trial court's dismissal order as to 
codefendants Dr. Rodier and Pioneer Clinic, who are not alleged, by Plaintiffs, to have 
provided any "affirmative" or direct care to Patient.9 
In any event, Plaintiffs derive their "malfeasance-nonfeasance" distinction from 
case law unrelated to health care.10 That distinction is not supported by this Court's 
mental health case law. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240; Wilson, 969 P.2d at 420 (addressing a 
possible duty arising from a failure to diagnose, indicating "nonfeasance," not 
"malfeasance"). 
Cases from other jurisdictions show that tragedy can easily arise from 
"nonfeasance," or failure to diagnose and treat mental conditions. In Tarasoffv. Regents 
9Indeed, Plaintiffs maintain that they are not required to establish a special 
relationship because they have alleged affirmative acts on the part of the defendants. See 
Br. of Appellees pp. 7, 16, 17. Plaintiffs argue that "plaintiff has to show a 'special 
relationship' only where a claim is based on an omission or a failure to act." Id. at 16. 
Accordingly, then, because Plaintiffs' claims against Dr. Rodier are based entirely on his 
failure to act, i.e., nonfeasance, see Amended Complaint at f 44, they must establish a 
special relationship between Dr. Rodier and the Patient. Because Dr. Rodier never even 
met the Patient, Plaintiffs' claims against Dr. Rodier necessarily fail under their own 
argument. 
10Cases cited by Plaintiffs for their "malfeasance versus nonfeasance" distinction 
(Br. of Appellants p. 10 n.2) are outside the health care context of this case. See 
University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987) (student trampoline accident 
at fraternity); Satterfieldv. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008) 
(secondary asbestos exposure to child of insulation worker); Williams v. Cunningham 
Drug Stores, Inc., 429 Mich. 495, 418 N.W.2d 381(1988) (store customer shot by 
robber); Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors, 97 Cal.App.4th 1193, 119 Cal.Rptr. 160 
(property subtenant injured by sliding door). 
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of the University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 (1976), a 
therapist allegedly failed to intervene when a patient allegedly expressed an intention, 
later carried out, to kill a specific victim. The therapist was held to have a potential duty 
of care toward the non-patient victim. Tedrick v. Community Resource Center, Inc., et 
al9 235 IU.2d 155, 920 N.E.2d 220 (2009), involved a patient who was allegedly not 
adequately treated for what appears to have been serious mental illness; he killed his wife. 
920 N.E.2d at 222-223 (reciting allegations of "paranoid delusions" and other symptoms 
that care providers allegedly failed to "properly diagnose, treat, and monitor"). In 
Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Center, et al.9 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 673 N.E.2d 
1311 (1997), mental health care providers were held potentially liable for failing to 
adequately diagnose and treat the patient; after a doctor discontinued his antipsychotic 
medications, the patient decompensated and killed his parents. Brady v. Hopper, 570 
F.Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983), affd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984), involved a mentally 
disturbed man, allegedly not adequately treated, who shot President Reagan. 
Suicide is widely understood to be a tragic consequence of untreated mental 
illness, particularly depression. Failure to diagnose and treat depression would be 
"nonfeasance," not "malfeasance," yet potentially actionable if the patient commits 
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suicide.11 
Plainly, Plaintiffs' "malfeasance versus nonfeasance" distinction makes no sense 
in the context of mental health treatment. Its adoption in this case, as urged by Plaintiffs, 
would create an improper incentive to not provide needed care. See Wilson v. Valley 
Mental Health, 969 P.2d at 420 (expressing concern that Utah's "duty to protect" statute, 
applicable to therapists, may create incentive to not adequately inquire into a patient's 
mental condition). The likely result would be more tragedies, not fewer, as treatable 
problems become worse due to lack of care. 
The "public versus private actor" distinction, also urged by Plaintiffs, also makes 
no sense in this health care context. Quoting this Court, Plaintiffs state that 
"governmental actors" need judicial protection from negligence claims. (Br. of Appellants 
p. 16-17.) However, such actors normally have statutory immunity, under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-7-101 through 63G-7-904 (West 2011). Even if government workers need 
extra liability protection in order to maintain the "pool of potential public servants," it is 
equally valid to hold that extra protection is due to health care providers, whether publicly 
or privately employed, in order to maintain a pool of these vitally-needed workers. 
In sum, under the Normandeau analysis, no duty, and no potential civil liability, 
existed between the non-patient Plaintiffs and the Defendant health care providers. For 
Plaintiffs' analogy to suicide (Br. of Appellants p. 20) simply is unpersuasive. 
Patient murdered somebody else; he did not take his own life. Had he committed suicide, 
a wrongful death claim, based on his death, could have proceeded. 
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this reason, as well as this Court's mental health case law, this Court should affirm the 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' amended complaint. 
POINT II 
PATIENT'S ADMISSION TO INTENTIONALLY KILLING 
HIS WIFE BARS PLAINTIFFS5 CLAIM THAT PATIENT'S 
MEDICATIONS CAUSED HIM TO KILL HER 
Summary judgment is appropriate, under Utah R. Civ. P. 56, when there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Bare allegations in pleadings do not create a factual dispute, if such 
allegations are rebutted by admissible record evidence. Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63 f 7, 
147 P.3d 439, 441 (citing authority). 
A 
Judicial Notice of Criminal Proceedings 
Defendants' alternative and additional motion, for summary judgment, relied upon 
materials outside the pleadings in this lawsuit—specifically, the record of David 
Ragsdale's criminal prosecution. The pertinent portions of that record were placed into 
the trial court record in this case, and so are before this Court for appellate review. See 
Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1977) (judicial notice may be taken of 
proceedings in another case so long as files from the other proceedings are introduced and 
disclosed). 
The facts in the criminal case record not subject to reasonable dispute, and 
Plaintiffs have not disputed them. Under those facts, summary judgment, in favor of 
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Defendants, is proper as an alternative or additional ground to affirm the trial court's 
judgment in this case. This is proper, even though the trial court rejected this ground. 
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996). 
B 
By Waiving any "Involuntary Intoxication" Defense, 
Patient Admitted that his Medications Did Not 
Cause Him to Murder his Estranged Wife. 
Plaintiffs claim that Patient killed his estranged wife, Kristy, due to the influence 
of his allegedly mis-prescribed medications. However, Patient waived that claim. He did 
so when he pled guilty to aggravated murder, including his express admission that he 
"intentionally or knowingly" killed his wife. (Fact 119-23.) Aggravated murder requires 
the "intentional or knowing" mental state. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (West 2011). 
The "diminished capacity" defenses of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (West 2011) 
include "involuntary intoxication" due to prescription medications. State v. Gardner, 870 
P.2d 900 (Utah 1993). Those defenses can defeat the criminal intent, or mens rea, 
required to commit a particular crime. Therefore, by admitting that he acted 
"intentionally or knowingly," Patient admitted that he did not act while involuntarily 
intoxicated. That is, he admitted that his medications did not cause him to kill his wife. 
The significance of that waiver, made with the assistance of counsel, is heightened 
in light of the relative burdens of proof. Had Patient gone to trial and presented just some 
evidence to support an "involuntary intoxication" defense, the prosecution would have 
been required to refute it under the strict "beyond reasonable doubt" standard. State v. 
39 
Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995) (burden of proving criminal mental state, beyond 
reasonable doubt, remains with prosecution under section 76-2-305). Had the prosecution 
failed to carry that burden, Ragsdale would have been acquitted of aggravated murder. 
Patient also could have raised involuntary intoxication as a partial defense, seeking 
a conviction for a lower degree of offense. One possibility was non-aggravated murder, 
which can be committed with mental states less culpable than "intentional or knowing." 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2011). Alternatively, or additionally, a jury could 
have returned a verdict of "guilty and mentally ill at the time of the offense," due to 
involuntary intoxication. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-102 (West 2011). 
Assisted by counsel throughout the criminal proceedings, Patient asserted no 
involuntary intoxication defense, for any of the above-described purposes. It is clear, 
from comments at the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing (Fact ff 13, 17,24, 27), 
that the possibility of doing so was prominently considered by Patient and his counsel, 
and was well-known to the criminal court. When Patient pled guilty to "intentionally or 
knowingly" murdering his estranged wife, he conclusively waived the involuntary 
intoxication defense, and any other "diminished capacity" defenses.12 He admitted that he 
did not kill her because of involuntary intoxication. 
By comparison, in Higgins, the mental health patient, who stabbed the victim, 
was found "guilty and mentally ill" of attempted homicide, which offense was 
subsequently reduced to attempted manslaughter. 855 P.2d at 234 & n.2. The patient in 
Wilson, who killed one person and injured another, was convicted of manslaughter and 
aggravated assault, under "guilty and mentally ill" pleas. 969 P.2d at 417. 
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Now, in their civil complaint against Patient's health care providers, Plaintiffs 
demand a trial, to prove that Patient did not intentionally murder his wife, but rather, 
killed her because of "toxic side effects from the combination of his prescribed 
medications." (Amended Complaint, R. 22, 25 Iff 29, 37.) In effect, they demand a trial 
to prove that Patient is innocent of aggravated murder; instead, "the medications made 
him do it." 
That demand should be rejected. Patient's mental state, at the time of the murder, 
has been conclusively litigated in his criminal prosecution. Based upon issue preclusion 
(Plaintiffs prefer the term "collateral estoppel"), Patient clearly could not re-litigate this 
issue. Plaintiffs, proposing to "step into Patient's shoes," should also be barred from re-
litigating it. In other words, their rights should be no greater than Patient's. 
C 
Why Issue Preclusion Bars Plaintiffs' Claim that 
Patient's Medications Caused Him to Kill his Wife. 
The elements of issue preclusion are: 
(1) The party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party, or in 
privity with a party, in the prior litigation. 
(2) The issue decided in the prior litigation must be identical to the one 
presented in the subsequent litigation. 
(3) The issue in the prior litigation must have been completely, fully, and 
fairly litigated. 
(4) The prior litigation must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
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Jensen ex rel Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17 141, 250 P.3d 465, 476-477. This 
Court has stated that issue preclusion applies "only" when the above four elements are 
satisfied. Id. 
This very unusual case does not implicate issue preclusion in its usual, classical 
sense. If issue preclusion can only apply when its elements are strictly and exactly 
satisfied, as implied Jensen v. Cunningham, supra, then Defendants cannot prevail on this 
point. 
However, this Court has elsewhere stated that issue preclusion serves several 
important judicial policies: "(1) preserving the integrity of the judicial system by 
preventing inconsistent judicial outcomes; (2) promoting judicial economy by preventing 
previously litigated issues from being re-litigated; and (3) preventing litigants from 
harassment by vexatious litigation." Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78 f 14, 99 P.3d 842, 
847. This case clearly implicates the first two policies. Judicial integrity is implicated, 
because Plaintiffs seek a civil judgment with respect to Patient's crime -"the medications 
made him do it"—that would be opposite to the outcome of the criminal prosecution— 
"the medications did not make him do it." Judicial economy is also implicated, because 
Plaintiffs' civil claims, if allowed to proceed, will entail the re-examination of evidence 
that has already been examined, and found lacking, in Patient's criminal prosecution. 
It therefore appears proper, in this unusual case, to apply issue preclusion in a way 
that promotes its underpinning goals. To do so, this Court should hold as follows 
regarding the elements of issue preclusion: 
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1. Privity. 
Plaintiffs were not formal parties to the criminal prosecution. However, they 
properly should be regarded, via their maternal grandparents, who have apparently 
adopted them, as being in privity with the prosecution. The grandparents were consulted 
about and approved Patient's guilty plea to aggravated murder. (Fact fflf 18, 26.) They 
spoke for Plaintiffs at Patient's sentencing. (Id.) In short, Plaintiffs exercised their crime 
victim rights under Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 et seq. (West 2010); Utah 
Const. Art. I § 28. In their exercise of those rights, Plaintiffs agreed with Patient's 
admission that he did not kill his estranged wife, Plaintiffs' mother, due to the influence 
of his prescription medications. 
Additionally, there appears to be no legitimate reason why Patient is not a party to 
this lawsuit. He certainly is a person "who has an interest relating to the subject matter" 
of this lawsuit, as well as a person over whom the trial court could exercise jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, he could feasibly be joined as a party plaintiff under Utah R. Civ. P. 19. 
Plaintiffs have offered no reason why they have not joined him. See Utah R. Civ. P. 19(c) 
(if any feasible party is not joined, then pleader must explain why). The only apparent 
reason is that Plaintiffs wish to avoid application of issue preclusion to this lawsuit. 
Such manipulation should be barred as a matter of judicial policy. A reasonably 
flexible application of the "privity" rule, to the singular circumstances of this case, will 
accomplish this. 
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2. Identical Issue. 
It is undeniable that Plaintiffs seek a result, in this case, that is opposite to a central 
finding in the criminal case. Patient is serving a life prison sentence, based upon his 
voluntary, fully-counseled admission that his medications did not cause him to kill his 
estranged wife. Plaintiffs now pursue a "medications made him do it" civil verdict. 
Attempting to avoid or minimize this conflict, Plaintiffs assert, without analysis, 
that "most simply, the issue of intent in the criminal case, and proximate cause in a civil 
tort action, are not identical." They seemingly imply that Patient's medications were 
merely "a" cause of the murder, with no indication as to what other causes may have 
existed. (Br. of Appellants p. 28-29.) 
The issue, properly defined, is: What caused Patient to form the criminal intent, or 
mens rea, with which he acted? Quite plainly, with assistance of counsel and of medical 
expertise, Patient considered and then waived his opportunity to assert that his intent was 
influenced by his prescription medications. (Fact \ 24.) In the criminal case, Patient 
admitted that he acted intentionally or knowingly—that is, with specific intent to kill. 
Because of the differing burdens of criminal and civil proof, that admission leaves 
no room for a civil verdict that Patient acted "partially intentionally" and "partially 
because of the medications," which is apparently what Plaintiffs wish to argue. As 
explained earlier, for a criminal "involuntary intoxication" defense to succeed, Patient 
needed only to create a reasonable doubt whether he acted with specific intent to kill. 
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When he waived that defense, Patient effectively conceded that his evidence did not raise 
such reasonable doubt—a very low burden. 
In this case, Plaintiffs would have to prove, by a substantially higher, 
"preponderance of evidence" standard, that Patient did act under the influence of 
involuntary intoxication. Therefore, it really does not matter whether, in this civil case, 
Plaintiffs will concede that Patient's criminal intent was caused by some factor in 
addition to his allegedly mis-prescribed medications. Patient has already consented to a 
criminal adjudication that leaves no room for such a "partly intentional, partly 
involuntary" civil verdict. The issue has already been decided, in a manner contrary to 
Plaintiffs' current desires. 
3. The Issue Was Litigated. 
Plaintiffs argue that "[w]aiving a defense is not litigating an issue." (Br. of 
Appellants p. 27.) Because Patient waived the "involuntary intoxication" defense via a 
guilty plea, Plaintiffs argue, their present claim of "the medications made him do it" is not 
barred by issue preclusion. Their argument does not account for the manner in which 
Patient's waiver was made in the criminal court. 
In compliance with longstanding Utah law and practice, the criminal court record 
shows that great pains were taken to assure that there was no "mere" waiver of any of 
Patient's rights and defenses. The criminal court carefully assured that he knowingly and 
voluntarily pled guilty to aggravated murder. (Fact | | 22-23.) The "involuntary 
intoxication" issue was prominently considered by everyone involved. (Fact fflf 13, 17, 
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24, 25, 27.) Upon considering that possible defense, Patient admitted, in open court, to 
intentionally or knowingly killing his wife—i.e., that he did not kill her due to involuntary 
intoxication. 
This Court has long insisted that criminal guilty pleas be taken with scrupulous 
care. See State v. Lovell, 2011 UT 36 ffif 7, 12-17, P.3d , (tracing history of 
"strict compliance" rule for accepting guilty pleas). When so taken, convictions founded 
upon guilty pleas are just as reliable as those founded upon guilty verdicts. Furthermore, 
in general, the term "litigate" includes these definitions: "To dispute or contend in form 
of law; to settle a dispute or seek relief in a court of law; to carry on a suit;...; to 
prosecute or defend by pleadings, evidence, and debate in a court." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 841 (5th Ed. 1979) (emphasis added). Patient's criminal conviction, in this 
case, included a knowing, voluntary settlement of the dispute whether he acted with the 
specific intent required for aggravated murder. 
The criminal case record makes this clear. The "intent" issue, with respect to 
criminal mens rea, was prominently addressed during the change-of-plea hearing, and 
again during sentencing. At the latter proceeding, the criminal court specifically rejected 
Patient's self-serving and contradictory suggestion that "the medications made him do it," 
observing that the murder was a "moment of incalculable cruelty and selfishness" by 
Patient. The court was "convinced that he knew exactly what he was doing." (Fact f 27.) 
"Clearly, if an issue is actually raised by proper pleadings and treated as an issue 
in a case, it is conclusively determined by the first judgment." Maoris & Assocs. v. 
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Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93 % 40, 16 P.3d 1214, 1223. By charging Patient with intentional 
or knowing murder, the criminal prosecutors raised his mental state, at the time of the 
shooting, in the criminal pleadings. By squarely treating the "involuntary intoxication" 
defense as an issue, and ultimately waiving that defense on the record, Patient, with 
assistance of counsel, knowingly permitted it to be conclusively rejected, in the criminal 
prosecution. Issues that are raised, carefully examined, and knowingly waived, have been 
"litigated." 
4. Final Judgment. 
Plaintiffs appropriately concede that Patient's criminal prosecution proceeded to 
final judgment. (Br. of Appellants p. 26 n.12.) But it is worth considering, as a matter of 
judicial policy, that Plaintiffs' civil cause of action, if allowed to proceed, seeks a result 
that could call the validity of Patient's criminal conviction into question. In urging that 
Patient killed his estranged wife due to the influence of his medications, Plaintiffs are 
effectively arguing that Patient is innocent of aggravated murder. 
In effect, Plaintiffs' efforts in this case may be viewed as an effort, intentional or 
otherwise, to undermine that final, criminal judgment. The prospect that Patient might try 
to raise his own "actual innocence" claim, based upon Plaintiffs' efforts in this case, is 
troubling. Plaintiffs may deny any intention to permit that to happen, but that choice is 
out of their hands. 
Utah's criminal and civil courts operate under different rules, but they do not 
inhabit different realities. At best, what Plaintiffs desire in this lawsuit is two opposite 
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adjudications: in the criminal case, "the medications did not make him do it;" in their 
proposed civil claims, "the medications did make him do it." That is no prescription for 
"preserving the integrity of the judicial system," Buckner v. Kennard, supra. Under a 
policy-based approach to issue preclusion, this Court should hold that Plaintiffs' claims, 
in this case, are barred. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained in Point I, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
conclusion that the non-patient Plaintiffs, in this case, cannot pursue the "negligent 
prescribing" claim that could be, but has not been, pursued by Patient. Alternatively or 
additionally, as explained in Point II, this Court may hold that Plaintiffs are barred from 
pursuing such "negligent prescribing" claim because the "causation" element of that 
claim has been conclusively litigated in the criminal court. Ultimately, this Court should 
AFFIRM the trial court's judgment of dismissal. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12, Utah R. Civ. P. 56; 
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State Court Rules 
*lUtah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*1 Part HI. Pleadings, Motions, and Orders 
•+ RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall serve an answer 
within twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty 
days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading stat-
ing a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply 
to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, 
within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this 
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion di-
rected to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive pleading 
shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action; 
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after the service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that 
the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable 
party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive plead-
ing or motion or by norther pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for 
relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the 
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss 
for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are pre-
sented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the 
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether 
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made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be 
heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings and determi-
nation thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or 
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a 
more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained 
of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after no-
tice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion 
was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is 
permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court 
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scan-
dalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other motions 
herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all 
defenses and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter 
make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer or 
reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to 
join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a 
later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and ex-
cept (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of 
as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion made pur-
suant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or is a for-
eign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable neces-
sity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any 
officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the 
service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective September 4,1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.] 
State court rules are current with amendments received through April 15, 2011 
(C) 2011 Thomson Reuters 
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State Court Rules 
3iUtah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*1 Part VII Judgment 
-f RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole 
case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the plead-
ings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist 
without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall there-
upon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as 
are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be con-
ducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a 
party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the 
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may re-
fuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be 
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and 
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective November 1,1997; November 1,2004.] 
State court rules are current with amendments received through April 15, 2011 
(C) 2011 Thomson Reuters 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Title 78B. Judicial Code 
^Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*8 Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
-f § 78B-3-402. Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act 
(1) The Legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for damages and the amount of judgments 
and settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases the 
insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased 
insurance premiums and increased claims is increased health care cost, both through the health care providers pass-
ing the cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medicine because he views a 
patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing 
to provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance. 
(2) In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are 
producing in the public's health care system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures de-
signed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance while 
at the same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it becomes un-
available from private companies. 
(3) In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the Legislature to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be 
commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional liability 
insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to expe-
dite early evaluation and settlement of claims. 
CREDIT(S) 
Current through 2011 General Session and First Special Session 
(C) 2011 Thomson Reuters 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Tab 2 
APPENDIX 2 
Amended Complaint, R. 19-29 
Tyler S.Young (11325) 
Allen K. Young (3583) 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
75 South 300 West 
Provo,UT 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-0700 
Facsimile: (801) 379-0701 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
B. R., a minor child, and C. R., a minor 
child, through their conservator 
WILLIAM M.JEFFS, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
TRTNA WEST, A.F.N.P, HUGO 
RODIER, M.D., and PIONEER 
COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL CLINIC 
and JOHN DOES I -X, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 100907025 
Judge : Denise Lindberg 
JURY TRIAL REQUESTED 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, Tyler S. Young and Allen 
K. Young of Young, Kester & Petro, and for cause of action against the defendants 
alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs were residents of Utah County, 
Utah. 
•TOSBR88F 
MR 3 0 2010 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
2. At all times relevant hereto, Trina West, Advanced Family Nurse 
Practitioner (hereinafter "A.F.N.P."), was licensed by the State of Utah to practice 
nursing at her principle place of business in Draper, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. At all times relevant hereto, Hugo Rodier, M.D., was licensed by the State 
of Utah to practice medicine at his principle place of business in Draper, Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
4. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Pioneer Comprehensive Medical 
Clinic retained, hired, supervised and controlled its staff and employees, and supervised 
as well as controlled, through granting of medical privileges, its medical staff at its place 
of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
5. At all times relevant hereto, John Does I through X were persons or 
entities residing in or doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
6. The tortious acts complained of occurred in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
7. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter in accordance with the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated Utah Code Annotated 78A-5-102 (2008 as 
Amended). 
8. Venue is properly laid with this Court in accordance with the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78B-3-307 (2008 as Amended). 
9. Plaintiff has met the requirements of Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
Section 78B-3-412. 
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FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 
10. Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 9 and further allege as follows: 
11. Utah law allows an Advanced Family Nurse Practitioner, like Trina West, 
to prescribe "Schedule II and III" controlled substances only in "consultation with" a 
licensed medical doctor. 
12. On or about April 16, 2007 David Ragsdale began a regular course of 
treatment at Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic with Trina West, A.F.N.P. 
13. On or about April 16, 2007 Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed David 
Ragsdale two powerful steroids (Testosterone and Pregnenolone). 
14. The steroids Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed David Ragsdale both carry 
the risk of causing psychiatric complications such as steroid-induced mania. 
15. Mr. Ragsdale was prescribed those steroids with little to no medical 
inclination. 
16. Testosterone is a "Schedule III" controlled substance. 
17. Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed Mr. Ragsdale testosterone without 
consulting Dr. Hugo Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor. 
18. On or about May 2, 2007 Trina West, A.F.N.P., increased Mr. Ragsdale's 
doses of Testosterone and Pregnenolone. 
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19. Trina West, A.F.N.P., increased Mr. Ragsdale's doses of the steroids 
without consulting Hugo Rodier M.D., or any other medical doctor. 
20. On or about July 9, 2007 Mr. Ragsdale had a follow up visit at the clinic. 
21. During that visit, Mr. Ragsdale was prescribed Concerta a "Schedule II" 
controlled substance by Trina West, A.F.N.P. 
22. Concerta is the brand name for the psychostimulant drug methylphenidate. 
23. Methylphenidate carries many of the same risks associated with 
methamphetamine. 
24. Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed David Ragsdale Concerta without 
consulting Hugo Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor. 
25. Trina West, A.F.N.P., diagnosed David Ragsdale with Attention Deficit 
Disorder (AD/HD), to justify the prescription for Concerta. 
26. On or about September 5, 2007, Trina West, A.F.N.P., doubled David 
Ragsdale's doses of Concerta from 36 mg to 72 mg per day. 
27. Trina West, A.F.N.P., doubled David Ragsdale's dose of Concerta without 
consulting Hugo Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor. 
28. On or before December 21, 2007, David Ragsdale represented to Trina 
West, A.F.N.P. that he was having marital problems and that a restraining order had been 
entered against him by his wife, Kristy Ragsdale. 
29. On or before December 21, 2007, David Ragsdale was displaying toxic 
side effects from the combination of his prescribed medications. 
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30. After a visit on or about December 21, 2007, and after several other visits 
at Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, David Ragsdale was being prescribed the 
following combination of psychotropic medications by Trina West, A.F.N .P.: 
• The psychostimulant Concerta at 54 mg daily 
• The tranquilizer Valium at 5 mg daily 
• The antidepressant Doxepin at 100 mg daily 
• The antidepressant Paxil at 40 mg daily 
• The steroid Pregnenolone at 600 mg daily 
• The hair-loss medication Propecia at 1 mg daily 
• The steroid Testosterone at 200 mg weekly by intramuscular injection 
31. On January 6, 2008, David Ragsdale shot his wife, Kristy Ragsdale (the 
mother of plaintiffs B.R. and C.R.), thirteen times in a church parking lot, in broad 
daylight, in front of several witnesses. 
32. Within two hours of the shooting, David Ragsdale turned himself in to the 
police. 
33. Blood toxicology reports taken from David Ragsdale show that he was 
within the prescribed ranges of all of his medications and that he had no illicit substances 
in his blood stream at the time of shooting. 
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COUNT 1 
NEGLIGENCE OF TRINA WEST, A.F.N.P. 
34. Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 33 and further allege as follows: 
35. Trina West, A.F.N.P., was negligent in the following, but not limited to 
the following particulars: 
a. The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to consult with Hugo Rodier, M.D., 
or any other medical doctor prior to prescribing David Ragsdale Testosterone and/or 
Concerta. 
b. The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to consult with Hugo Rodier, M.D., 
or any other medical doctor prior to increasing David Ragsdale's doses of Testosterone 
and/or Concerta. 
c. The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to have a consultation plan with Hugo 
Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor prior to prescribing David Ragsdale 
Testosterone and/or Concerta. 
d. The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to have adequate justification for 
prescribing David Ragsdale the combination of medications he was being prescribed in 
the months leading up to the shooting of Kristy Ragsdale. 
e. The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to discontinue David Ragsdale's 
prescription regimen. 
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f. The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to properly monitor, refer, and treat 
David Ragsdale. 
36. The negligence of Trina West A.F.N .P. was likely to cause the conduct 
toward Kristy Ragsdale that led to her shooting and death. 
37. The failures of Trina West A.F.N.P., were a direct, proximate, and 
foreseeable cause of the conduct that led to the shooting, as well as death, of Kristy 
Ragsdale. 
38. As a result of the negligence of Trina West, A.F.N.P., Plaintiffs have lost 
the care comfort, society, and support of their parents. 
39. The Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe emotional 
distress as a result of the negligence of Trina West, A.F.N.P. 
COUNT 2 
NEGLIGENCE OF HUGO RODIER, M.D. 
40. Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 39 and further allege as follows: 
41. On information and belief, Hugo Rodier, M.D., was Trina West's 
supervising and/or "consulting" physician at Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic. 
42. Utah Law required Tina West, A.F.N.P., to have a "consultation plan" 
with a medical doctor which would allow her to then consult with a medical doctor to 
prescribe schedule II and III controlled substances to David Ragsdale. 
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43. On information and belief, although Dr. Hugo Rodier, M.D., knew or 
should have known Trina West, A.F.N.P. was treating David Ragsdale, and prescribing 
David Ragsdale medications, no consultation plan existed between Hugo Rodier, M.D., 
and Trina West, A.F.N.P. 
44. The failure of Hugo Rodier, M.D., to follow the appropriate standard of 
care also includes, but is not limited to: 
a. The failure of Hugo Rodier, M.D., to consult with Trina West, A.F.N.P., 
about David Ragsdale's treatment and prescriptions. 
b. The failure of Hugo Rodier, M.D., to properly monitor, refer, and treat 
David Ragsdale. 
45. The negligence of Hugo Rodier, M.D. was likely to cause the conduct 
toward Kristy Ragsdale that led to her shooting and death. 
46. The failures of Hugo Rodier, M.D., were a direct, proximate, and 
foreseeable cause of the conduct that led to the shooting, as well as death, of Kristy 
Ragsdale. 
47. As a result of the negligence of Hugo Rodier, M.D., Plaintiffs have lost 
the care comfort, society, and support of their parents. 
48. The Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe emotional 
distress as a result of the negligence of Hugo Rodier, M.D. 
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COUNT 3 
NEGLIGENCE OF PIONEER COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL CLINIC 
AND JOHN DOES I - X 
49. Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 48 and further allege as follows: 
50. The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, and John Does I -
X, by and through their agents, staff, nurses and employees, to follow the appropriate 
standard of care includes, but is not limited to: 
a. The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and John Does I -
X, by and through their agents, staff, employees and nurses to properly monitor, refer, 
and treat David Ragsdale. 
b. The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, by and through its 
agents, staff, employees and nurses to ensure that Trina West, A.F.N.P., was not 
exceeding her ability and authority to prescribe David Ragsdale medications. 
c. The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, by and through its 
agents, staff, employees and nurses to ensure that Trina West, A.F.N.P., and Hugo 
Rodier, M.D., had a proper consultation plan. 
51. The negligence of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and John Does I 
- X was likely to cause the conduct toward Kristy Ragsdale that led to her shooting and 
death. 
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52. The failures of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic were a direct, 
proximate, and foreseeable cause of the conduct that led to the shooting, as well as death, 
of Kristy Ragsdale. 
53. As a result of the negligence of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, 
Plaintiffs have lost the care, comfort, society, and support of their parents. 
54. The Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe emotional 
distress as a result of the negligence of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic. 
COUNT 4 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
55. Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 54 and further allege as follows: 
56. Plaintiffs claim that the acts or omissions of the defendant Trina West, 
A.F.N.P., Hugo Rodier, M.D., Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and John Does I -
X, were a result of willful and malicious conduct, or conduct that manifested a knowing 
and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows: 
1. For general and special damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
2. For interest on special damages from January 6, 2008, to the date of judgment 
herein; 
3. For punitive damages in an amount to be proved at trial; 
4. For trial by Jury; 
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5. For costs of suit incurred herein; and 
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper in the 
premises. 
DATED this z<ft\ day of April, 2010. 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
rgysfor Plaintiffs 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury. 
DATED this € ^ ^ 1 day of April, 2010. 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
for Plaintiffs 
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STEPHEN W. OWENS - #6957 
J. KEVIN MURPHY - #5768 (of counsel) 
EPPERSON & OWENS, P.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 983-9800 
Telefax: (801) 983-9808 
sowens@eolawoffice.com 
kmurphv@eolawoffice.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Trina West, A.F.N.P. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
B.R., a minor child, and C.R., a minor child, ] 
through their Conservator WILLIAM M. ] 
JEFFS, ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. ] 
TRINA WEST, A.F.N.P., HUGO RODIER, ] 
M.D., and PIONEER COMPREHENSIVE ] 
MEDICAL CLINIC, ) 
Defendants. ] 
) RULING AND ORDER GRANTING 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
) DISMISS 
I Civil No. 100907025 
1 Judge Denise Lindberg 
Defendant Trina West, A.F.N.P., joined by co-defendants Hugo Rodier, M.D., and 
Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, has moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). These defendants have also moved, alternatively or additionally, for 
summary judgment against plaintiffs under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(b). On December 20, 2010, oral 
argument was heard on these motions, with counsel for all parties present. 
Having reviewed the parties5 memoranda and heard oral argument, this Court now rules 
as follows: The Court is persuaded that the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted. 
uuum 
Third Judicial District 
l-tb 0 1 2011 
** " deputy Clerk 
This is based upon the fact that no patient-health care provider relationship existed, at the time of 
the underlying events, between the plaintiffs - who are the children of David and Kristy 
Ragsdale - and the defendants. The patient was David Ragsdale, who is not a party to this 
lawsuit. The Court is not persuaded that, under the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, the 
non-patient plaintiffs may step into David Ragsdale's shoes to pursue a malpractice lawsuit 
against the defendants. 
In light of its ruling on the motion to dismiss, it is not necessary to decide the defendants' 
alternative motion for summary judgment. However, if this Court were to reach that alternative 
motion, it would deny it. Denial would be based upon the defendants' failure to satisfy all 
requirements for issue preclusion, which they assert as the basis for their alternative motion. 
Specifically, issue preclusion is not satisfied because the plaintiffs in this civil case were not 
parties to the previous, criminal case against David Ragsdale; nor were they in privity with any 
party to that case. 
For the foregoing reasons, and for the additional reasons stated from the bench on 
December 20, 2010, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion to 
dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. 
- 2 -
SO ORDERED fhis^V day of J 
Approved as to form: 
2011. 
BY THE COURT 
DEMSELINDBE 
District Court Judge 
- 3 -
COURT'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that on the JQ_ day of ^QMitfj\ , 20f( , I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RULING AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS to the following: 
Tyler S. Young, Esq. 
Allen K. Young, Esq. 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
75 South 300 West 
Provo,UT 84601 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Jonah Joel Orlofsky 
LAW OFFICES OF JONAH ORLOFSKY 
122 S. Michigan Avenue, Suite 1850 
Chicago, IL 60603-6140 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Vaun B. Hall, Esq. 
CAMPBELL CAMPBELL & FERENCE 
1245 E. Brickyard Rd., #505 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Attorneys for Hugo Rodier, M.D. 
Michael K. McKell 
MCKELL CHRISTIANSEN 
642 East Kirby Lane, Suite 104 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Attorneys for Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic 
Stephen W. Owens 
J. Kevin Murphy 
EPPERSON & OWENS, P.C. 
10 West 100 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Trina West, AFNP 
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APPENDIX 4 
State v. Ragsdale, Criminal docket R. 63-78 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs DAVID RAGSDALE 
CASE NUMBER 081400235 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 76-5-202 - AGGRAVATED MURDER Capital (amended) to 
1st Degree Felony 
Offense Date January 06, 2008 
Plea November 26, 2008 Guilty 
Disposition November 26, 2008 Guilty 
Charge 2 - 76-5-109 1 - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN PRESENCE OF CHILD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Offense Date January 06, 2008 
Plea June 02, 2008 Not Guilty 
Disposition November 26, 2008 Dismissed 
Charge 3 - 76-5-109 1 - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN PRESENCE OF CHILD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Offense Date January 06, 2008 
Plea June 02, 2008 Not Guilty 
Disposition November 26, 2008 Dismissed 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Division 3 
PARTIES 
Defendant - DAVID RAGSDALE 
Represented by DEFENDER PUBLIC 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name DAVID RAGSDALE 
Date of Birth October 28, 1972 
Law Enforcement Agency LEHI POLICE 
Prosecuting Agency UTAH COUNTY 
This case involves domestic violence 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due 196 00 
Amount Paid 196 00 
wv,ancTP -ntrnnrts ?ov/casesearcli/CaseSeaich?action=caseHist 5/21/2010 
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Credit: 
Balance: 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
REVENUE 
REVENUE 
REVENUE 
REVENUE 
REVENUE 
REVENUE 
REVENUE 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
10.00 
10.00 
0.00 
0.00 
COPIES 
3.00 
3.00 
0.00 
0.00 
DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
FEE 
DETAIL - TYPE: REPORTER 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit• 
Balance: 
DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
FEE 
10.00 
10.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
FEES 
25.00 
25.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
0.50 
0 .00 
0.00 
DETAIL - TYPE: SPECIAL SEARCHES 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
FEE 
11.25 
11.25 
0.00 
0.00 
85.75 
85.75 
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CASE NUMBER 081400235 State Felony 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
20.00 
20.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES 
Amount Due: 3.00 
Amount Paid: 3.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
20.00 
20.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES 
Amount Due: 6.50 
Amount Paid: 6.50 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
PROCEEDINGS 
01-11-08 Filed: Motion to Continue 
Filed by: STATE OF UTAH, 
01-28-08 Case filed 
01-28-08 Filed: From an Information 
01-28-08 Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK assigned. 
01-28-08 Filed: Bail M.E.: Court Finds Probable Cause: No Bail: 
FFA-1/28/08 8:30 a.m. 
01-28-08 Filed order: Media Request 
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Signed January 25, 2 00 8 
01-28-08 Filed: Affidavit: No Warrant Arrest and Detention 
01-28-08 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on January 28, 2008 at 08:30 AM in 
Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
01-28-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
PRESENT 
Clerk: joyc 
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GREGORY G SKORDAS 
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Audio 
Tape Number: 0 8-201 3 Tape Count: 8:36 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant. 
Defendant waives reading of Information. 
Advised of charges and penalties. 
The defendant appears in custody of Utah County Sheriff. 
WAIVE PRELIM HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 02/06/2008 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
01-28-08 WAIVE PRELIM HEARING scheduled on February 06, 2008 at 01:30 PM 
in Second Floor, Rm 201 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
01-28-08 Charge 1 amended to 1st Degree Felony 
01-31-08 Filed: Request for Discovery 
01-31-08 Filed: Appearance of Counsel 
02-06-08 Filed order: Media Request for Still Photography in Courtroom 
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Signed February 06, 2 00 8 
02-06-08 Minute Entry - WAIVE PRELIM HEARING continued 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
PRESENT 
Clerk: raelenec 
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GREGORY G SKORDAS 
Audio 
Tape Number: 0 8-201 3 Tape Count: 2.16 
CONTINUANCE 
The Stipulation of counsel has made a motion for continuance of 
Waive Prelim Hearing. 
The motion is granted. 
Reason for continuance: 
Counsel's request. 
WAIVE PRELIM HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 03/05/2008 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
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125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84601 
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
02-06-08 WAIVE PRELIM HEARING Continued. 
02-06-08 WAIVE PRELIM HEARING scheduled on March 05, 2008 at 01:30 PM in 
Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
03-05-08 Minute Entry - WAIVE PRELIM HEARING continued 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kristinw 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SKORDAS, GREGORY G 
Audio 
Tape Number: 08-06-201 Tape Count: 1:57 
CONTINUANCE 
The Stipulation of counsel has made a motion for continuance of 
Waive Prelim Hearing. 
The motion is granted. 
Reason for continuance: 
Pending evaluation. 
The defendant appears in custody of the Utah County Sheriff. 
WAIVE PRELIM HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 04/09/2008 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 2 01 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT x 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84601 
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
03-05-08 WAIVE PRELIM HEARING Continued. 
03-05-08 WAIVE PRELIM HEARING scheduled on April 09, 2008 at 01:30 PM in 
Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
04-09-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for Waive Prelim Hearing 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
PRESENT 
Clerk: joyc 
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SKORDAS, GREGORY G 
Audio 
Tape Number: 08-201 12 Tape Count: 2:03 
HEARING 
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This matter comes before the Court for Waiver Hearing. The 
defendant appears in custody of Utah County Sheriff. 
One-half day Preliminary Hearing is requested on this matter. 
Mr. Sturgill addresses an issue of a No-Contact Order be granted 
between the Ragsdale family and the victim's mother. 
The Court instructs the State to file a Motion with an Affidavit 
and an Order in support of such request. 
Preliminary Hearing is scheduled on this matter. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 05/12/2008 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84601 
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
04-09-08 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on May 12, 2008 at 08:30 AM in 
Second Floor, Rm 201 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
05-07-08 Filed order: Media Request for Still Photography in 
Courtroom/The Deseret Morning News (approved) 
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Signed May 07, 2008 
05-09-08 PRELIMINARY HEARING Modified. 
Reason: Counsel stipulated. 
05-09-08 SCHEDULING CONF scheduled on May 12, 2 00 8 at 08:30 AM in Second 
Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
05-12-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Judge: DAVID MORTENSEN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: raelenec 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SKORDAS, GREGORY G 
Audio 
Tape Number: 08-2 01 15 Tape Count: 9.04 
HEARING 
TAPE: 08-201 15 COUNT: 9.04 
This matter comes before the Court for Scheduling Conference. The 
parties have stipulated to continue the Preliminary Hearing 
regarding this matter. 
The defendant appears in custody of the Utah County Sheriff. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 05/27/2008 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 2 01 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
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125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84601 
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
05-12-08 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on May 27, 2008 at 08:30 AM in 
Second Floor, Rm 201 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
05-22-08 Notice - NOTICE for Case 081400235 ID 9881618 
Nothing to Report 
05-22-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
PRESENT 
Clerk: raelenec 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R 
Defendant not present 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SKORDAS, GREGORY G 
Audio 
CONTINUANCE 
The Stipulation of counsel has made a motion for continuance of 
Preliminary Hearing. 
The motion is granted. 
Reason for continuance: 
Conflict in attorney schedule 
HEARING 
This matter comes before the Court for a telephone conference. 
The parties stipulate with the Court to continue the preliminary 
hearing due to a conflict in Mr. Skordas's schedule. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 06/02/2008 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84601 
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
Date: 06/02/2008 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84601 
before Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
05-22-08 PRELIMINARY HEARING Continued. 
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05-22-08 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on June 02, 2008 at 01:30 PM in 
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Date 
Time 
Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
05-22-08 Notice - NOTICE for Case 081400235 ID 9881619 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 
06/02/2008 
01:30 p.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
before Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
05-2 9-08 Filed return: Subpoena (Robert Wigginton) 
Party Served 
Service Type 
Service Date 
Robert Wigginton 
Personal 
May 22, 2008 
05-29-08 Filed return: Subpoena (Scott Wiggins) 
Scott Wiggins 
Personal 
May 22, 2008 
Party Served: 
Service Type: 
Service Date: 
05-2 9-08 Filed return: Subpoena (David Peterson) 
Party Served: David Peterson 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 22, 2008 
06-02-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
PRESENT 
Clerk: joyc 
Reporter: EATON, JEFFERY 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SKORDAS, GREGORY G 
Audio 
Tape Number: OFF 
HEARING 
TAPE: OFF This matter comes before the Court for Preliminary 
Hearing. The defendant appears in custody of Utah County Sheriff. 
State calls Ann Palizzi, mother of Kristy Ragsdale. Ms. Palizzi 
is sworn and testifies on direct by Mr. Johnson. Exhibit la, Map 
of Parking Lot, is offered, marked and identified. Questioning 
continued. 
Mr. Skordas cross-examines the witness. 
Follow up by Mr. Johnson. Witness sketches small version of 
parking lot [Exhibit 1(a)] and marks where the defendant and the 
victim were both standing at the time of the shooting. Sketch of 
Marking Lot is identified and marked as Exhibit 1(b). 
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Witness excused. 
Exclusionary Rule is invoked for before and after all testimony 
stated by the witnesses. 
Robert Aaron Wigginton is sworn and testifies on direct by David 
Sturgill. Witness indicates on Exhibit la direction he was driving 
into Church lot. 
Witness is cross-examined by Mr. Skordas. 
Witness is excused. 
Officer Jeffrey Alan Fewkes is sworn and testifies on direct by 
Mr. Johnson. Followed with cross by Mr. Skordas. 
Witness is excused. 
Michael Stillwell is sworn and testifies on direct by Mr. 
Sturgill. Exhibit lc is offered, marked and received. Questioning 
continues by Mr. Sturgill. Cross by Mr. Skordas. Witness excused. 
John Scott Wiggins is sworn and testifies on direct by Mr. 
Sturgill. Mr. Wiggins indicates on Exhibit 1(a) how he entered an 
approached the parking lot on the day of the offense. Questioning 
ensues. 
Cross examination by Mr. Skordas. (Exhibit 1(d), Lehi P.D. 
Witness Statement, with attachment of a sketch of the crime scene, 
is offered, marked and received. Witness is excused. 
COUNT: 3:46 
Court recesses. 
COUNT: 3:59 
Court resumes with all parties present and ready to proceed. 
Kevin Peterson is sworn and testifies on direct by Mr. Sturgill. 
Mr. Peterson indicates on Exhibit 1(a) what he had observed when he 
entered the Church parking lot. Exhibit 1(e), Mr. Peterson's 
scratch note of license plate # he had witnessed seeing the 
scene, is offered, marked, identified and received. 
Questioning continues followed by cross by Mr. Skordas. 
Witness excused. 
Officer Mark Birch is sworn and testifies on direct by Mr. 
Johnson. Exhibit 2 is offered, marked and received, Photograph of 
deceased. State's Exhibits 3, 4 and 5 are offered, marked and 
identified, all still pictures taken after the body was removed. 
These are still photographs taken by fire engine ladder of the 
church parking lot indicating location of vehicles. 
Exhibit 6 is offered, marked and identified, photograph of one of 
the prior witnesses parked vehicle. Exhibit 11 is offered, marked, 
identified and received: schematic of church lot created by this 
witness showing bullet fragments, casings, etc. 
Exhibit #9 is offered, marked, identified and received re: 
photograph of weapon found in defendant's vehicle. Exhibit 10 is 
offered, marked, identified and received re: medical report 
prepared by Dr. Deeters, Medical Examiner. 
Witness identifies the defendant. Cross by Mr. Skordas. 
Witness excused. 
Officer Toby Petersen, Lehi P.D., is sworn and testifies on 
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direct by Mr. Sturgill. 
State rests. 
Defense does not intend to put on any evidence today. Mr. Skordas 
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confers with his client re: the decision made by the defense. 
Real focus today is the aggravating factor. Counsel is to focus 
on the aggravating factor in closing arguments. Mr. Sturgill 
addresses the Court with closing arguments. Mr. Skordas addresses 
the Court with closing arguments. 
The Court finds the offense took place in Utah County, the 
defendant has been identified, the victim is deceased, the 
defendant caused the victim's death, the aggravating factor has 
been met as to the Wigginton family and the victim's mother, the 
defendant was aware people were coming and going at the Church, 
the State has carried its burden as to Count 1, the matter took 
place in the presence of chiLdren, the defendant was co-habitant 
with the victim, probable cause is found as to Counts 2 and 
and 3, likelihood of death as to surrounding witnesses, probable 
cause is found on all counts. 
The defendant is arraigned today and enters not guilty pleas to 
all counts. 
Mr. Skordas addresses the Court regarding bail in this matter. 
Mr. Sturgill responds. The Court finds there is substantial 
evidence to support this charge. The Court upholds the bail and 
the defendant is to remain in custody with no bail. 
Mr. Skordas requests this matter be set for a Scheduling 
Conference. The State withdraws all evidence. 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE/PTC is scheduled. 
Date: 07/09/2008 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84601 
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
06-02-08 Notice - Final Exhibit List 
06-02-08 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE/PTC scheduled on July 09, 2008 at 01:30 
PM in Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
06-03-08 Charge 1 Plea is Not Guilty 
06-03-08 Charge 2 Plea is Not Guilty 
06-03-08 Charge 3 Plea is Not Guilty 
06-10-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 10.00 
06-10-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 3.0 0 
06-10-08 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 10.00 
Note: POSTAGE-COPIES 
06-10-08 POSTAGE-COPIES Payment Received: 3.00 
06-30-08 Filed: Withdrawal of Counsel 
07-09-08 Filed order: Affidavit of Indigency 
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Signed July 09, 2008 
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07-09-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
PRESENT 
Clerk: raelenec 
Reporter: EATON, JEFFERY 
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SKORDAS, GREGORY G 
Audio 
Tape Number: 08-201 23 
HEARING 
TAPE: 08-201 23 This matter comes before the Court for Pretrial 
Conference. The defendant appears in custody of the Utah County 
Sheriff. 
Mr. Skordas addresses the Court regarding withdrawal as counsel; 
granted. Affidavit of Indigency is submitted to the Court and 
Public Defender is appointed. 
Mr. Ragsdale is ordered to notify his sister to provide all 
material given to her by Mr. Skordas be given to Public Defender's 
Office by 12:00 p.m. 07/10/08. 
Utah County Jail is ordered to allow the defendant to call his 
sister as soon as possible regarding the return of all documents to 
the Public Defender's Office. 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE. 
Date: 08/06/2008 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
07-09-08 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on August 06, 2008 at 01:30 PM in 
Second Floor, Rm 201 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
07-10-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 10.00 
07-10-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.00 
07-10-08 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 10.00 
07-10-08 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.00 
07-10-08 Note: Received CD audio request form. 
07-10-08 Note: Received request for transcript form. 
07-10-08 Filed: Transcript request form for Preliminary Hearing 
06-02-08; requested by William M. Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs. 
07-14-08 Filed: Request for Discovery 
07-14-08 Filed: Motion for Production and Preservation of Physical 
Evidence 
Filed by: CURTIS R HUSSEY BUSINESS ACCOU, 
07-14-08 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion for Production and 
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Preservation of Physical Evidence 
07-16-08 Filed: Notice of Appearance of Counsel 
07-17-08 Filed: Transcript request form for Preliminary Hearing 
06-02-08; requested by Michelle Nelson of UCPD Association. 
07-18-08 STATUS HEARING scheduled on July 23, 2 008 at 01:30 PM in Second 
•— •*-•*-«-». «-.. / / i r n l i n -t^ /~t- c it^nH-o nr^//rQc^cparrh/raqpSlearch?action=caseHist 5/21/2010 
Floor, Rm 201 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
07-18-08 Filed: Stipulation 
07-23-08 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on October 01, 2008 at 01:30 PM 
in Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
07-23-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for STATUS HEARING 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
PRESENT 
Clerk: raelenec 
Reporter: SOUTHWICK, COLLEEN 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): HILL, DEBORAH A 
Audio 
Tape Number: 08-201 29 
HEARING 
TAPE: 08-201 29 This matter comes before the Court for Status 
Hearing. The defendant appears in custody of the Utah County 
Sheriff. 
Counsel stipulates to extend time period in which the State must 
give notice of intent to seek the death penalty to September 30, 
2008. 
Hearing scheduled for 08/06/08 is stricken. 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 10/01/2008 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84601 
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
07-23-08 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE Cancelled. 
Reason: Counsel stipulated. 
07-30-08 Note: Hearing date of 6-2-08 Preliminary Hearing before Judge 
Laycock 
07-30-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 25.00 
07-30-08 REPORTER FEES Payment Received: 2 5.00 
Note: REPORTER FEES 
08-15-08 Filed return: Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Party Served 
Service Type 
Service Date 
Pioneer Comprehensive Medical 
Personal 
August 14, 200 8 
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09-17-08 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE Cancelled. 
Reason: Counsel stipulated. 
09-17-08 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE rescheduled on September 24, 2008 at 01:30 
PM Reason:. 
09-24-08 STATUS CONFERENCE scheduled on November 26, 2008 at 01:30 PM in 
Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
09-24-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
PRESENT 
Clerk: raelenec 
Reporter: SOUTHWICK, COLLEEN 
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): HOWELL, ANTHONY L 
Audio 
Tape Number: 08-201 37 
HEARING 
TAPE: 08-201 37 This matter comes before the Court for Pretrial 
Conference. The defendant appears in custody of the Utah County 
Sheriff. 
Mr. Howell addresses the Court regarding Stipulation agreed upon 
by both parties. Mr. Howell is to prepare an Order in this matter 
regarding stipulation. 
Status Conference is scheduled. 
STATUS CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 11/26/2008 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
09-24-08 Filed: Stipulation 
09-26-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.50 
09-26-08 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.5 0 
Note: 1.00 cash tendered. 0.5 change given. 
10-10-08 Filed order: Order 
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Signed October 10, 2008 
10-14-08 Filed: Original Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, June 2, 2 008 
by Jeff S. Eaton 
11-26-08 SENTENCING scheduled on January 29, 2009 at 01:30 PM in Second 
Floor, Rm 201 with Judge LAYCOCK. 
11-26-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
PRESENT 
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Clerk: raelenec 
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KAWAI, RUSSEL-PAUL H 
Audio 
Tape Number: 08-201 48 Tape Count: 1.42 
HEARING 
TAPE: 08-201 48 COUNT: 1.42 
This matter comes before the Court for Scheduling Conference. The 
defendant appears in custody of the Utah County Sheriff. 
Mr. Kawai addresses the Court stating the parties have reached an 
agreement. The defendant will plead guilty to Count 1 as charged 
and Counts 2 and 3 are dismissed. 
Information is amended by interlineation. Statement by defendant 
is received and accepted by the Court after factual basis is given. 
Defendant waives time for sentencing. 
Adult Probation and Parole is to meet with the defendant at the 
Utah County Jail for preparation of the PSI Report. 
Sentencing is scheduled. 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 01/29/2009 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84 601 
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
11-26-08 Filed order: Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea 
and Certificate of Counsel 
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Signed November 26, 2 00 8 
11-26-08 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty 
11-26-08 Charge 2 Disposition is Dismissed 
11-26-08 Charge 3 Disposition is Dismissed 
01-22-09 Filed order: Media Request for Still Photography in the 
Courtroom (granted) 
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Signed January 22, 2 0 09 
01-29-09 SENTENCING rescheduled on January 30, 2009 at 10:30 AM 
Reason: Counsel stipulated.. 
01-30-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCING 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
PRESENT 
Clerk: joyc 
Reporter: SOUTHWICK, COLLEEN 
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S 
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Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KAWAI, RUSSEL-PAUL H 
Audio 
Tape Number: 09-201 4 Tape Count: 11:07 
HEARING 
TAPE: 09-201 4 COUNT: 10:45 
This matter comes before the Court for Sentencing. Discussions, 
on the record, take place between the Court and counsel being 
conducted in chambers. 
COUNT: 11:07 
Discussions conclude in chambers. 
COUNT: 11:22 
Court resumes in session. Defendant appears in custody of Utah 
County Sheriff. The Court summarizes discussions in chambers. The 
Pre-Sentence report has been amended. Amended Report will be sent 
to the Board of Pardons. 
The Court states in open court the agreement between the parties, 
however, strongly indicates the ultimate time the defendant will 
spend in prison will be upon the decision of the Board of Pardons. 
Mr. Kawai addresses the Court, speaking on behalf of Mr. Howell 
and Ms. Hill, stressing the remorse their client has been feeling. 
Mr. Ragsdale addresses the Court reading a statement prepared by 
himself, followed by a statement prepared by the Ragsdale family 
read by Mr. Kawai. 
Mrs. Ann Palizzi addresses the Court stating a lengthy description 
regarding her daughter. Ms. Palizzi concludes with thanking the 
community and many others for their support throughout this 
tragedy. 
Jamie and Aaron Wignington address the Court stating the effect 
the crime has affected their family. 
Terri Hunter and Samantha Hollister address the Court reiterating 
the effects their families have inflicted due to the crime, with 
final comments stated by Matt Soren. 
Sentencing is imposed. The Court reserves jurisdiction over 
restitution for 60 days regarding the Wigington family. 
Restitution for the Kristy Ragsdale Estate and Children was 
resolved through a civil lawsuit. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED MURDER a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than twenty years and which may be life in the Utah 
State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
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To the UTAH County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends to the Board of Pardons the defendant receive 
3 89 days credit for time served. In addition Court recommends 
defendant participate in mental health therapy while incarcerated 
at the prison. 
SENTENCE FINE SUSPENDED NOTE 
The Court suspends all fines and fees. 
01-30-09 **** PRIVATE **** Filed: Adult Probation & Parole/PSI Report 
01-07-10 Fee Account created Total Due: 11.25 
01-07-10 Fee Account created Total Due: 85.75 
01-07-10 SPECIAL SEARCHES Payment Received: 11.25 
01-07-10 COPY FEE Payment Received: 8 5.75 
04-27-10 Fee Account created Total Due: 20.00 
04-27-10 Fee Account created Total Due: 3.00 
04-27-10 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 20.00 
Note: POSTAGE-COPIES, Mail Payment; 
04-27-10 POSTAGE-COPIES Payment Received: 3.00 
05-05-10 Fee Account created Total Due: 20.00 
05-05-10 Fee Account created Total Due: 6.50 
05-05-10 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 2 0.00 
Note: POSTAGE-COPIES, Mail Payment; 
05-05-10 POSTAGE-COPIES Payment Received: 6.50 
05-10-10 Filed: Request for Copy of Audio Record (11/26/08 & 1/30/09 
mailed to Epperson & Owens) 
05-10-10 Filed: Request for Copy of Audio Record (3/5/08 hearing mailed 
to Epperson & Owens) 
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State v. Ragsdale, Criminal Plea Hearing, R. 127-153 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DAVID RAGSDALE 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 081400235 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 NORTH 100 WEST 
PROVO, UTAH 84601 
PLEA BARGAIN HEARING 
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED ON 
NOVEMBER 26, 2008 
Reported by: Colleen C. Southwick, RPR/CSR 
©PY 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
1 
EXHIBIT 
3-
\o-i 
2 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
DAVID STURGILL 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center #2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
RUSTY KAWAI 
Utah County Public Defenders 
245 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 846 01 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. KAWAI: Your Honor, No. 25 on the calendar is 
David Ragsdale. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll call the Ragsdale 
matter. We have our court reporter? Very good. All right. 
Mr. Kawai, we're ready to go forward? It's my 
understanding from having met with the attorneys this morning 
that a plea agreement has been reached and that Mr. Ragsdale is 
going to enter his plea today. 
the 
Is 
MR. 
that correct, 
KAWAI: 
THE COURT: 
record what the 
amendments I need tc 
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And 
Mr 
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MR. STURGILL: Yes, my understanding is that Mr. 
Ragsdale is going to plead to Count 1 as charged, aggravated 
murder, and in exchange with respect to the Information, the 
State would then make a motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 3, both 
counts are third-degree felonies, domestic violence in the 
presence of child. 
THE COURT: All right. Is that your understanding as 
well? 
MR. KAWAI: It is, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. With that, upon his plea I 
will dismiss Counts 2 and 3. This obviously takes care of the 
capital portion. 
MR. STURGILL: It does, Judge. 
THE COURT: And the State is giving up its right to 
move forward as a capital felony. All right. 
Mr. Kawai, before I begin going through the 
defendant's rights with him, would you put on the record for me 
what efforts have been made by your office with regard to 
representing Mr. Ragsdale in this matter and speaking with him 
about this plea agreement. 
MR. KAWAI: Yes, your Honor. As the Court is aware, 
when Mr. Ragsdale was assigned to our office, we assigned three 
attorneys; myself, Andy Howell and Debbie Hill as his 
attorneys. Debbie Hill was the chief lead attorney in this 
case. 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KAWAI: We also retained a mitigation expert who 
has been doing mitigation research into the Ragsdale matter. 
Also, a psychologist and a factual expert as well --
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KAWAI: -- has been doing some factual --
THE COURT: Investigation. 
MR. KAWAI: Investigation. 
THE COURT: All right. Would you get the microphone 
a little bit closer to your mouth. 
MR. KAWAI: Sure. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KAWAI: About two months ago Mr. Ragsdale and I 
talked about -- he's had a desire to resolve this case for 
several months now. We have in our mind what that resolution, 
the right resolution should be. We are a bit off with the 
prosecutors and there's been some back and forth with us and 
the prosecutors and trying to weigh the desires of the victims 
in this case, namely Ann Palizzi and Al Palizzi. Those are 
Kristy's parents. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KAWAI: And last Friday I received a call from 
Mr. Johnson, one of the prosecutors in this case, giving me 
their counteroffer. Friday morning I met with David and with 
the team, with Andy Howell and Debbie Hill. We came to the 
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1 conclusion that it was the right thing to do. At that time Mr. 
2 Ragsdale asked me if we could get some other opinions on this 
3 matter. We all highly value Ron Yangich's opinion. I made a 
4 call into Ron Yangich. Ron was gracious enough to talk to me 
5 about the ins and outs of this plea and he was in agreement 
6 that this was the right thing to do for David. 
7 Sunday at 2:30 Lieutenant Carter at the jail arranged 
8 for the Ragsdale family to come meet with David through the 
9 glass and the legal team, and that was an emotional meeting 
10 with all the family members. We discussed the ins and outs of 
11 this plea with Ted Ragsdale, Judy Ragsdale, which are David's 
12 parents, Christy Ragsdale was present, David's sister, Steve 
13 Labrum, David's cousin, was present, John Ragsdale was present 
14 and so was Tamara Ragsdale. We discussed at length the pros 
15 and cons of the plea and came out with positive feelings about 
16 this plea as well. 
17 Monday morning Deputy Hill and I met again with David 
18 Ragsdale on a contact visit. We brought with us Don Blanchard 
19 who is retired from the State. Don served for a number of 
20 years on the Board of Pardons. The purpose of that meeting 
21 with Mr. Blanchard was to basically tell Dave what he could 
22 expect in prison, the prison life that David would be looking 
23 at. There were no guarantees made by Mr. Blanchard to David to 
24 influence his decision. It was simply this is how the Board of 
25 Pardons will treat your case. This is what will likely happen 
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to you when you get put into the prison. You'll go into R and 
0, you'll go through indoctrination, you'll be put in maximum 
confinement for a period of time and then you can work into 
general population. That was the nature of that meeting. 
THE COURT: Were any promises made to him at all with 
regard to an outcome with the Board of Pardons or anything else 
like that? 
MR. KAWAI: Absolutely not. 
THE COURT: You understand that, Mr. Ragsdale? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KAWAI: And I think it was really Friday that 
David and I talked about this plea and we were feeling that 
this was the way we wanted to go. Obviously Mr. Yangich's 
opinions on this weighed heavily as well. Mr. Yangich agreed 
to accept a call from David yesterday at the noon hour and he 
personally went over the plea agreement as proposed by the 
State and we've come to the conclusion that this was the right 
way to go for, not just the Ragsdale family, not just for David 
Ragsdale, but for Ann and Al Palizzi and Brandon and Carter 
Ragsdale. So this is what we want to do. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ragsdale, is everything 
that Mr. Kawai just explained to me the truth as you understand 
it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
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THE COURT: And you understand any discussions you 
had with Mr. Yangich or any discussions you had with 
Mr. Blanchard or with your attorneys, that no one can predict 
what the Board of Pardons will do when they have all the facts 
before them with regard to how long you stay at the prison? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any more questions that you want to ask 
your attorney about anything that we've discussed so far? 
THE DEFENDANT: Not at this time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me have the State tell me 
any further agreements with regard to the plea agreement and 
then also whether or not the victim's families and in the case 
of the father and the sons, the victims, are on board with 
this? 
MR. STURGILL: Judge in addition to the defendant 
pleading guilty to Count 1, we've also reached an agreement 
with respect to sentencing. Excuse me. The joint agreement is 
that we would be recommending that the defendant be sentenced 
to 20 years to life, that is life with parole. 
THE COURT: All right. Then talk to me about your 
discussions with the victims. 
MR. STURGILL: With respect to our discussion with 
the victims, Judge, last week Mr. Johnson and I had contacted 
the Palizzi family. We explained the agreement that we were 
intending to propose or extend to the defense. Ms. Palizzi 
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wanted some time to talk it over with her family which she did. 
She got back to us, I believe, late last week and told us that 
she agreed with the plea bargain and gave us the green light. 
Just last night I met with the Wigington family. If 
you'll recall, Judge, the Wigingtons, it was Mr. Wigington and 
his two sons that were walking into church when this occurred. 
I met with them last night. I explained to them the proposed 
plea bargain. They are comfortable with the plea bargain and 
in agreement with this resolution. We discussed going to 
trial. We discussed the possibilities had we gone that course. 
We've also discussed the possibilities with this plea bargain 
and I feel like they -- that they are well aware of what's 
going on today and they have consented to this plea bargain. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MR. STURGILL: Your Honor, Ms. Wigington is actually 
present in the courtroom today and I spoke to her just a moment 
ago. Last night there was some trepidation. This afternoon 
she feels better. 
THE COURT: Okay. I would also indicate for the 
benefit of the record that the parties have met with me and 
have explained the plea agreement and especially the agreement 
about the life with parole, for 20 years to life with parole. 
MR. KAWAI: And, Judge, I've also explained to my 
client that that is life with the possibility of parole. 
THE COURT: Right. Thank you. 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
1 MR. KAWAI: That doesn't necessarily mean he will 
2 have parole. That means that he may be eligible for it at some 
3 time and he is aware of that. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Thank you for correcting the 
5 vernacular. And I have agreed to be bound by the parties' 
6 decision and that's what I will order at the time of 
7 sentencing. Obviously to all of us probation is not going to 
8 be an option here and we're only talking about prison for this 
9 defendant. 
10 You understand that, Mr. Ragsdale? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: I do, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: All right. Then let me ask Mr. Kawai, 
13 have you gone through a statement before pleading guilty with 
14 the defendant in this matter? 
15 MR. KAWAI: Yes, your Honor. I believe that the 
16 Court and the State also has an exact copy of the statement 
17 that I've gone over with Mr. Ragsdale. I went over it 
18 paragraph by paragraph with David. He understands the rights 
19 that he's waiving. He understands the maximum punishment and 
2 0 the fines that can be imposed and he understands that these are 
21 the elements of the crime that are being alleged and that he's 
22 agreeing that that is what happened on the 6th of January, 
23 2008. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Ragsdale, you've 
25 probably seen me do what I'm about to do with other defendants 
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before. I'm going to do much more with you because of the 
nature of this crime and the nature of the penalty that you 
face. 
Let me ask first are you thinking clearly today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely. Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And we've talked at great length about 
what has gone into setting up this agreement and what's gone 
before this plea today. 
Do you wish any additional time to talk to any of 
your attorneys before we go forward today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with your attorney's 
advice? 
THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: And are you satisfied with what they have 
been able to do for you, not only with the plea agreement, but 
with all other aspects of their representation? 
THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: Now, have you read through that statement 
carefully yourself paragraph by paragraph? 
THE DEFENDANT: I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is there any part of it that you do not 
understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: There ' s not. 
THE COURT: Is there any part of it that you want to 
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1 discuss in any way at greater length with any of your 
2 attorneys? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Let me work my way through it. First of 
5 all, you understand that you are pleading, as charged in the 
6 Information in Count 1, to aggravated murder, a first-degree 
7 felony? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: And you understand that the penalty for 
10 that according to statute is 20 years at a minimum for which it 
11 may be your lifetime. 
12 Do you understand that? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: There is a possibility of parole, but 
15 there is no guarantee. Do you understand that? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Do you understand that the elements here 
18 are that on January 6th of 2008 in Utah County, Utah, I believe 
19 the city was Lehi, right? 
20 MR. KAWAI: It was. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. That you intentionally or 
22 knowingly caused the death of another, Kristy Ragsdale, and 
23 that you knowingly created a great risk of death to a person 
24 other than the victim and you. 
25 Do you understand that those are the elements? 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. Those are the elements that the 
3 State would be required to prove if this matter were to go to 
4 trial. 
5 Do you understand that? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: All right. And do you understand that by 
8 pleading guilty today you'll be admitting that you committed 
9 that crime as described by those elements? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: And you understand that in a few minutes 
12 when I get to that point, I'm going to have the State, one of 
13 the prosecutors, provide me with a factual basis. And at that 
14 point I'm going to ask you whether you admit that that is what 
15 happened. 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Now, everything we're doing 
18 today is intended to make sure that you're entering this plea 
19 voluntarily, that you understand what you're doing. First of 
20 all, you understand obviously you have the right to be 
21 represented by counsel and you are still represented by counsel 
22 today. 
23 Any questions that you have with regard to that 
24 right? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: Obviously you didn't waive your right to 
2 counsel and counsel has been provided by the State in this 
3 matter. Once, again, let me just ask. Are you satisfied with 
4 the advice and the help that you have received from your 
5 counsel? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: You understand that what you're giving up 
8 by entering this plea today is your right to a speedy and 
9 public trial by an impartial jury? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: You also understand that as part of that 
12 jury trial right, you give up your right to see and observe the 
13 witnesses who would be testifying against you? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: And you understand also that you would 
16 give up your right to have your attorneys cross-examine those 
17 witnesses who would testify against you? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Do you also understand that you would be 
20 allowed to compel witnesses to come and testify on your behalf? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: And that by entering this plea today 
23 you're going to give up that right as well? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Do you also understand that if you 
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couldn't afford to subpoena those witnesses and pay for their 
attendance, the State would pay for those witnesses to come? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you also understand that at that trial 
you could testify, if you wanted to, and tell the jury your 
side of the story? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You also understand that you have a right 
not to testify and you could choose not to tak€* the stand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you also understand that if you chose 
not to testify, the jury would be instructed that they couldn't 
hold that against you? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And knowing all of that about your right 
to testify or not, do you give up those rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You understand that your plea of guilty, 
excuse me, your plea, your original plea of not guilty allows 
you to be presumed innocent by the jury until they hear all the 
facts and decide otherwise? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you understand by entering this plea 
today you are going to give up the right to be presumed 
innocent by that jury? 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: You understand if we went to trial, that 
3 the State would have the burden of proving each of those 
4 elements of the crime that I described to you? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: And you understand that if there were a 
7 trial, in this case I believe it would be -- well, depending on 
8 how it would have gone forward, 8 or 12 jurors -- you would 
9 have -- they would have been required to reach a unanimous 
10 verdict in order to convict you? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: And you understand that by entering this 
13 plea today you're going to give up that right to require that 
14 unanimous verdict? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: You also understand that by entering this 
17 plea today you're going to give up your right to appeal any 
18 issues that might be before me or before an appellate court? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: And knowing all of that do you want to go 
21 forward with this plea today? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
23 MR. STURGILL: Judge, just one thing. Perhaps I 
24 didn't hear, but I've been following along with the Court --
25 THE COURT: All right. If I skip something catch me. 
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MR. STURGILL: I believe you skipped that the State 
would have to prove each and every element beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
THE COURT: Oh, did I not say the reasonable doubt? 
MR. STURGILL: I didn't hear you. 
THE COURT: Let me just do it as a precaution. 
You understand that the burden being shifted to them 
or the responsibility being the State's to prove you guilty on 
each element requires that they prove you guilty on each 
element beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. And knowing that you want to 
give up that right, give up placing that responsibility on them 
and go forward with your plea today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Now, we've talked 
a little bit about the penalties that -- the penalty that 
you're facing here. This is a statutory penalty, and part of 
this plea agreement is that you will plead and the sentencing 
would be the 20 years which may be for life with a possibility 
of parole. 
You understand all of that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you understand that as far as parole 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
is concerned, that's not a part of my control? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you understand that that would be in 
the hands of the Board of Pardons? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you understand that any discussions 
you've had with your attorneys or Mr. Yangich or Mr. Blanchard, 
regardless as to what they think might or might not happen, 
that decision ultimately, as to how long you remain at the Utah 
State Prison, will be made by the Board of Pardons? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You also know as far as the fine is 
concerned, that you're facing the possibility of a $10,000 fine 
plus an 85 percent surcharge? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And that that is in my discretion. That 
won't be the Board of Pardons' decision. That would be in my 
discretion. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. I don't think I need to talk 
about any issues as to consecutive sentencing as you're being 
only sentenced on -- or will be sentenced on only this one 
single crime as the other two will be dismissed. 
MR. STURGILL: Judge, the issue of restitution. 
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THE COURT: Thank you. There is always the 
possibility of restitution in this matter. And I may, upon 
proper proof or an agreement between the parties, order that 
you pay restitution in this matter. 
You understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And I•m aware that there's been 
settlement in the civil case. And I can't tell you today how 
that works or what that would have to do with it. Your 
attorneys would need to give you any advice as to that, but I 
just want you to understand that I have the power and the 
responsibility to assess restitution if I find it's justified 
by the facts. 
You understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. I think we've adequately put 
on the record the plea agreement. Does either of the parties 
want to say anything more about the plea agreement? 
MR. STURGILL: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, is there anything in any 
of the discussions you've had with anyone, not just your 
attorneys or the outside experts that you've talked to, but 
also family or anyone else, friends, anyone else that makes you 
feel that you are doing this today under any force or under any 
coercion? 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Is there anything that's made you feel 
3 that you have been threatened in any way to enter this plea 
4 today? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Do you believe in the end that you're 
7 doing this because it's the best thing for you to do at this 
8 time? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: And as far as any promises, are there any 
11 promises that you feel that have been made -- any time before 
12 this moment that have been made that would induce you to enter 
13 into this plea? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: You're 36? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: I am, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: And how much schooling have you had? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: I have a high school education, your 
19 Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Did you have any difficulty 
21 reading this statement that your attorney has right there in 
22 front of you? 
23 THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Were you under the influence 
25 of any drugs or medication or other intoxicants at the time 
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1 that you entered the agreement or decided that you would enter 
2 this plea today? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any 
5 medication or drugs or intoxicants now that would affect your 
6 ability to knowingly and voluntarily go through with this plea 
7 today? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Do you feel that not only now, but in the 
10 process of talking to your attorneys and making these decisions 
11 that you have been mentally sound and that you've been capable 
12 of making the decision that brings you here to me today? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Do you feel that you are free of any 
15 mental disease or defect or impairment that would prevent you 
16 from understanding what you were doing today? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: And do you believe that there is anything 
19 that would prevent you from entering a knowing and intelligent 
2 0 and a voluntary plea in this matter today? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Lastly --
23 MR. KAWAI: Your Honor, if we could have a quick 
24 clarification. 
2 5 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. KAWAI: The Court asked if he believed that he 
2 was under any impairment that would prevent him and there may 
3 have been a positive response to that. If we can back up just 
4 a paragraph. 
5 You're not under any medical condition at this point 
6 that would affect your entering this plea today, right, David? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. Anything that I haven't covered in 
9 any way that would make you feel hesitant or uncomfortable 
10 about entering this plea today? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Are there any questions you want to ask 
13 me before we go forward with your plea? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Not at this time, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else that's come up in 
16 the last few minutes that you want to discuss with your 
17 attorneys? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: The last thing I want to let you know is 
2 0 that my understanding is that we are going to refer this to the 
21 Department of Corrections, the Office of Adult Probation and 
22 Parole for a presentence report, and we're going to set 
23 sentencing -- I think we already have a date in mind at the end 
24 of January. 
25 If you believe there's good cause to withdraw the 
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plea that you enter today, you must file a written motion 
before I sentence you. Otherwise, you're cut off and you would 
not be able to make that motion. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you also understand that there's no 
guarantee I would grant such a motion. It's just that this is 
the time period during which such a motion could be made. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
MR. KAWAI: Your Honor, if I could have a moment? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Discussion between attorney and client.) 
MR. KAWAI: Judge, I discussed with my client the 
right that he has to be sentenced within 4 5 days. He will 
waive that right so that we can go forward with sentencing on 
the 2 9th. 
THE COURT: All right. Is that your desire? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And knowing that you have a right to be 
sentenced in the next two to 45 days, do you give up that 
right? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me ask the State, is 
there anything else that you would like me to cover? 
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MR. STURGILL: Just one 
incorporate by reference this 
your colloquy 
his 
do. 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: Oh, yeah, I 
thing, Judge. I'd ask 
written plea agreement 
will. 
that 
into 
STURGILL: All right. Anything else, Mr. Kawai? 
KAWAI: No, Judge. 
COURT: Okay. With that then I'm ready to take 
plea unless the parties have anything else you want me to 
Okay. Let me turn to the Information, Mr. Ragsdale 
To the charge contained 
murder, in violation of Utah Code 
what is your plea? 
the 
THE 
THE 
agreement 
DEFENDANT: Guilty, 
in Count 1, aggravated 
Annotated Section 76-5-
your Honor. 
-202, 
COURT: I will dismiss Counts 2 and 3 pursuant to 
of the parties, and 
counts. I accept your plea. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
those are the only other 
STURGILL: Judge, did you want to --
COURT: I'm sorry. 
STURGILL: Okay. 
COURT: Just relax. 
me first -- has he already signed 
the 
MR. 
THE 
document 
MR. 
KAWAI: No. 
COURT: Okay. Let' 
then. 
KAWAI: I've dated 
I'm getting there. 
I'll take care of it. 
the document? 
s have him go ahead and 
it for him the 26th of 
Let 
sign 
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November 2 0 08, the date today. May I approach? 
THE COURT: Please. As indicated earlier, I have 
reviewed this already. A copy was provided to me this morning. 
I looked at it very carefully and we have on the record made 
our way completely through this. It has been signed by the 
defendant in my presence just right now. It's already been 
signed by Mr. Kawai. I'm not sure whose signature this is from 
the prosecution. 
MR. STURGILL: That would be mine first, Judge, and 
Mr. Johnson follows mine and the numbers are our bar numbers 
are respective for each name. 
THE COURT: Oh, all right. Thank you. It's been 
signed by the two prosecutors. Having reviewed the document I 
will sign it and date it today's date, the 26th of November. 
And as always, we will make it a part of the record. It is a 
reflection and a written record of everything that we have done 
on the record. I think we've done it carefully enough. We 
actually didn't need this, but we have both. 
All right. So with that, having made the record, 
having had the defendant enter his plea of guilty to Count 1, 
having dismissed Counts 2 and 3, I accept the defendant's plea 
of guilty to aggravated murder. 
I find that the defendant understands the rights that 
are described in this statement as well as the rights that we 
have discussed here on the record. I find that he understands 
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the plea agreement in this matter. I find that he understands 
the penalty that he is facing with regard to time at the Utah 
State Prison, and I find that he has knowingly, voluntarily, 
intelligently and intentionally waived all of the rights that 
we've talked about on the record and that are described in this 
statement, and that he has entered his plea in such a manner. 
Now, we have previously agreed that sentencing would 
be on Thursday January 29th at 1:30. Is that still a good 
time? 
MR. STURGILL: That's a good date. Judge, could we 
approach? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Off the record discussion.) 
THE COURT: Having said that I would do it earlier 
on, I forgot. I need a factual basis. 
MR. STURGILL: Judge, on January 6th, 2008, the 
defendant intentionally shot and killed Kristy Ragsdale, the 
defendant's wife. The murder occurred in an LDS Church parking 
lot in Lehi as Kristy walked from her car to the chapel doors. 
When Mr. Ragsdale initially shot Kristy, standing behind her 
several yards were Aaron Wigingtons and his two sons. A round 
actually struck the front grill of the car the Wigingtons were 
standing beside and thereby knowingly created a great risk of 
death to another. 
THE COURT: All right. And those are the facts as I 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
16 
26 
remember them from the preliminary hearing. 
Do you admit that that is what happened? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you for catching that 
one, Counsel. And with that, I still accept the plea making 
all the findings that I made before and incorporating the 
statement into the record. All right. 
Anything else we need to cover that was forgotten in 
the rush of doing this? Okay. Then I'm going to refer the 
defendant to the office of Adult Probation and Parole for a 
presentence report. We will notify them that you are being 
held at the Utah County Jail. They will work with you. I'll 
encourage you to fill out the paperwork as carefully and as 
accurately as possible for them in preparing a report and I 
will see you next on January 29th at 1:30 in the afternoon. 
Anything else, Counsel? 
MR. STURGILL: No, your Honor. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. 
(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(The following proceedings were held in chambers.) 
THE COURT: All right. We are on the record in 
chambers. It's about quarter to 11. This is the matter of 
State versus Ragsdale, our File No. 081400235. I have here for 
the State David Sturgill, Craig Johnson. I have here for the 
defense Debbie Hill, Dusty Kawai and Andy Howell. We're 
recording this both on recorder and with the court reporter. 
And I have my clerk Kristin here. 
So Mr. Sturgill wanted to address some things that he 
feels should be corrected in the pre-sentence report. Go 
ahead. 
MR. STURGILL: Judge, I111 first reference page 4. 
This may be just a matter of clarification. The very last 
paragraph before Subsection C, that paragraph tends to give the 
impression that Mr. Ragsdale, upon his arrest, was questioned 
by officers and readily admitted to what he'd done and 
mentioned that it was due to medication. 
THE COURT: Would you read the language you're 
speaking of, please, into the record? 
MR. STURGILL: I will. It says, "He admitted his 
involvement in the incident but stated he was under the 
influence of medications which may have caused him to become 
charged enough to commit this offense." 
THE COURT: Enraged enough. 
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MR. STURGILL: Or I'm sorry, enraged. "Officers 
questioned the defendant for several hours during the 
investigation then transported Mr. Ragsdale to the Utah County 
Jail where he remained incarcerated." 
That gives the impression that the defendant was 
questioned immediately after his arrest and admitted his 
involvement. That is untrue. It is also possible that the 
writer was simply stating that during his investigation he 
admitted to his involvement and blamed the medication, but I 
just want to clear that up; that when he was arrested by Lehi 
City Police, he immediately invoked his right to counsel. He 
was not questioned by police. He was detained for several 
hours. He did make some spontaneous statements unrelated to 
this offense, but in no way was he questioned by police and in 
no way did he admit his involvement, at least on January 6th. 
THE COURT: So how would you correctly state whatever 
should be at the end of this factual summary of the offense? 
MR. STURGILL: I think that's a good suggestion. 
Just redact that paragraph. 
MS. HILL: And I would agree with that, your Honor. 
My memory --
THE COURT: Let's get to the microphone. 
MS. HILL: I'm sorry. My memory of the discovery is 
that Greg Skordas was hired immediately. He was hired that 
day. David did turn himself in and voluntarily turned himself 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
1 in which that paragraph right above the one the State is 
2 objecting to indicates that he had counsel immediately that day 
3 so he did not make statements that day. 
4 THE COURT: Should we just put at the end of the 
5 previous sentence after the words and turned himself in period, 
6 he thereafter invoked his right to counsel and immediately 
7 retained counsel? 
8 MR. STURGILL: That would be fine. 
9 MS. HILL: That's fine, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to make that 
11 change. Hang on. 
12 All right. I have changed the second-to-the-last 
13 paragraph of the factual summary of the offense on page 4. At 
14 the end of the second-to-the-last paragraph I have added the 
15 following: He invoked his right to counsel and immediately 
16 retained counsel. I have stricken the last paragraph. I will 
17 initial that on my copy. 
18 With that, mr. Sturgill, do you approve those 
19 changes? 
20 MR. STURGILL: I do. 
21 THE COURT: And with that, Ms. Hill, do you approve 
22 those changes? 
23 MS. HILL: Yes, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: All right. That takes care of that 
25 issue. What's the next issue? 
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MR. STURGILL: I apologize, Judge. I skipped a page. 
On page 3 under the offense title and further under the plea 
agreement title under Subsection A the investigator correctly 
states what the original charges were and then down below that 
states that through plea negotiations the defendant pled guilty 
to the following: Count 1 they have included the language 
amended. That charge was never amended. The defendant pled 
guilty as charged. So I'm not quite sure what that is there 
for. I would ask that you strike that word amended in parens 
following Count 1 in that paragraph. 
MS. HILL: I don't object to that. 
THE COURT: All right. So I'm just -- under the 
sentence through plea negotiations the defendant pled guilty to 
the following: Count 1 dash I'm going to strike out the word 
amended and just leave it aggravated murder, a first-degree 
felony. I think it's a misunderstanding on the pre-sentence 
writer's part as to -- I don't think he understands that you 
have the 6 0 days after arraignment to decide whether or not to 
do capital. So that's the difference I think. 
MR. STURGILL: Sure. In fact, Judge, along that same 
vain I'd ask you to go up to Count 1 under the originally 
charged heading and strike the capital in Count 1. 
THE COURT: And just make it aggravated murder? Any 
objection? 
MS. HILL: No. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. I'll do the same. I'll 
2 strike out the word capital. So under Mr. Ragsdale was 
3 originally charged with the following: It reads, Count 1 dash 
4 aggravated murder, a first-degree felony. 
5 All right. That change is made and initialed. 
6 MR. STURGILL: Okay. Thank you, Judge. The 
7 bottom -- the last paragraph on that same page, page 3, it 
8 reads, Once he located her, he immediately exited his vehicle 
9 and fired a total of 12 shots with a handgun at Ms. Ragsdale at 
10 close range hitting her with nine shots. It is true that he 
11 fired 12 rounds. What we dispute and want changed is the 
12 description of how many times she was shot. According to the 
13 medical examiner's report there was -- all 12 shots that he 
14 fired actually hit her. There was one entry wound to the 
15 chest, eight entry wounds to the back and three entry wounds to 
16 the head totaling nine shots or 12 shots, I'm sorry. 
17 THE COURT: What about the extra bullet in the car? 
18 You got to count for that one. 
19 MR. STURGILL: Well, it was a cartridge. It was an 
20 empty shell casing. 
21 MR. KAWAI: Judge, we dispute that. We had our 
22 expert reconstruct the crime scene and we -- not that it makes 
23 a huge difference, but we were quite certain that 11 of those 
24 shots actually hit her. As she was falling, one shot missed 
25 her and lodged into the --it lodged into the grill of the 
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vehicle. That shot did not hit Ms. Ragsdale. That shot missed 
her as she was falling and went into the vehicle so 11 of the 
shots did. 1 believe that there are 12 entry wounds, but one 
of the entry wounds is through her hand and then it goes into 
her shoulder making two entry wounds with one bullet. 
MR. STURGILL: That would be the 13th hole. Medical 
examiner -- according to the medical examiner it was one entry 
wound to the chest, eight to the back and three to the head. I 
think rather fight over this, Judge, how about a compromise 
that we say at least 11 rounds. 
MR. KAWAI: Correc t. 
MS. HILL: And we wouldn't object to that. 
THE COURT: So it would read, Once he located her, he 
immediately exited his vehicle and fired a total of at least 11 
rounds ? 
MR. STURGILL: Twelve shots with a handgun. 
THE COURT: Okay. Fired a total of 12 shots with a 
handgun at Ms. Ragsdale at close range hitting her with at 
least 11 rounds or 11 shots. 
Everybody agreed on that? 
MS. HILL: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. So it will read hitting her 
with at least 11 shots, all right? I've made that change and 
initialed it. Moving on. 
MR. STURGILL: Judge, page -- well, actually it's 
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1 form one of the general matrix. And I'll be honest with you 
2 I'm not quite sure how to address this since this general 
3 matrix doesn't really include aggravated murder. 
4 THE COURT: Hang on a second. Is it before or after 
5 the letters? 
6 MR. STURGILL: Before the letters. It's following 
7 page --
8 THE COURT: Got it. Okay. Form one general matrix, 
9 okay? 
10 MR. STURGILL: Yeah. Going through the general 
11 matrix, I mean, if this is to be done and we are to consider 
12 this, then under the last category under the general matrix 
13 where it says weapons use in current offense, it says only when 
14 current conviction does not reflect weapon use or when 
15 statutory enhancement is not involved do you give points for 
16 this particular, I guess, category. 
17 Our position is is if this is to be considered and 
18 this is used for the Board of Pardons, then he should be 
19 charged with six points for having caused injury. The 
2 0 aggravated murder charge, there's nothing in the aggravated 
21 murder charge that reflects a weapon was used. 
22 THE COURT: Ms. Hill. 
23 MS. HILL: I'm objecting to that, your Honor. I 
24 believe the aggravated murder charge does reflect a weapon was 
25 used. It includes the aggravating factor that he put others at 
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a great risk of death. That could only be through the use of a 
gun. And factual basis here, the murder here was through use 
of a gun so I think that the offense itself as charged and as 
pled does reflect the use of a weapon. 
THE COURT: Talk to me, Counsel, about the 
progression here. We start with zero for none, one for 
constructive possession, two points for actual possession, 
three for displayed or brandished, four for actual use and then 
six for injury caused. Well, we're beyond that. Death. And 
it seems to me in all honesty that if they wanted to go that 
extra step, they could have. It seems to me there's an 
argument to be made for the fact that if you have a death, then 
it somehow takes it out of this because we have more than an 
injury caused. We have a death. And to me this is different 
degrees as it gets worse and worse construction -- constructive 
possession to actual, to displayed, to actual use, to actually 
using an injury if you had a weapon and here we have a death. 
It seems to me that that's taken in account when you have a 
charge of murder. 
MR. STURGILL: Well, and I understand that, Judge, 
and I respect your opinion clearly or certainly, but I think 
that there are even murders that don't -- the murder statute 
does not necessarily require use of a weapon. 
THE COURT: Exactly. You can have aggravated murder 
and not have a gun. 
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1 MR. STURGILL: And the same is true with aggravated 
2 murder and where - - had we charged the murder or charged the 
3 aggravated murder or even charged the enhancement for using a 
4 weapon in the Information, then it would remove this as a 
5 possibility of us using that. Nothing in the actual charge 
6 itself reflects the use of a weapon. I mean, clearly most 
7 murders occur by use of a weapon, but if it is not reflected in 
8 the charge itself, just because it has been used -- well, 
9 because it has been used we have this. We have this category 
10 on the matrix to include points that reflect that if the charge 
11 itself doesn't necessarily require that a weapon be used. 
12 I can't imagine that a straight-up murder because a 
13 death occurred would remove or preclude your Honor or the Board 
14 of Pardons from considering this particular subsection, the 
15 weapons use in current offense. I don't think that was the 
16 intent of the Board of Pardons when they drafted these 
17 guidelines or the Court when they drafted these guidelines. I 
18 think that's precisely what it's there for, regardless of 
19 whether it's a murder, ag assault or any other kinds of 
20 offense, if an injury is caused and it's not reflected in the 
21 charge itself, then that's the reason for this so it can be 
22 taken into account and it can be recognized. 
23 I understand that it says injury caused and the fact 
24 that more than an injury occurred, I understand that approach, 
25 but I don't think this was meant to not be considered if it 
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went beyond injury and actually resulted in the death of a 
victim. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Hill? 
MS. HILL: Your Honor, I agree with what the Court 
was just saying. I'm thinking of those scenarios with assault 
cases that we have where they look at whether or not the weapon 
was used and the extent to which it was used and that' s the 
progression that they've set out under the matrix and so 
that's -- I like what the Court was saying that we're beyond 
that. We're beyond injury. This is at the point of death, 
therefore, that category doesn't contemplate the murder charge. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sturgill? 
MR. STURGILL: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm going to leave this the way it is for 
several reasons. No. 1, this is an issue that's not clearly 
defined on the matrix itself. We don't have anybody here from 
Adult Probation and Parole or the Board of Pardons to explain 
my concern. And it appears to me that where they have left off 
this ascending scale at six points for injury caused and not 
gone further into like eight or ten points for an actual death, 
it seems to me that under their explanation where it says when 
statutory enhancement is not involved, I have statutory 
enhancement regardless of whether or not there was a weapon in 
a sense because this is a homicide. 
We have an aggravated murder here. He is facing life 
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1 in prison and because it's an aggravated murder which 
2 admittedly is for other reasons. It was not for a gun, but 
3 because of the proximity of the other witnesses it appears to 
4 me that this matrix was not set up for a homicide. And had 
5 they wanted points to be assessed for an actual death, then 
6 they would have done something more than six points for injury 
7 caused. They would have added extra points for the actual 
8 death. And they haven't. And I don't feel that it's my place 
9 to reconstruct what they may or may not have meant and to try 
10 and fix it for them. And without anyone here to explain 
11 otherwise, I don't feel that I should make that distinction and 
12 in essence try and fix it for them. 
13 Bottom line is the Board of Pardons is going to have 
14 all the latitude they need to keep him for as long as they 
15 want. And I don't think six points is going it make any 
16 difference otherwise, and I think for me to assess it doesn't 
17 make sense at this juncture so I deny that request. I'm going 
18 to leave the total score at zero unless there was something 
19 else you wanted to address on this page, M r . Sturgill? 
2 0 MR. STURGILL: No. Very good, your Honor. Judge, 
21 last thing I want to address is on form two under the 
22 aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
23 THE COURT: All right. 
24 MR. STURGILL: Subsection 15, it's going to be very 
25 much the same argument that I just made. The aggravating 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
iffli 
14 
factor, violence committed in the presence of a child, these 
are not to be considered if they are reflected in the charges. 
In this case if you'll recall -- this is Mo. 15 --
THE COURT: Under aggravating circumstances. 
MR. STURGILL: -- under aggravating circumstances. 
We dismissed the domestic violence charges in the presence of a 
child. The aggravated murder, although it does require others 
be placed in great risk of danger or death, it does not require 
that those others that are in danger be children. And so my 
position is or the State's position is that the charges or the 
charge -- the only charge that we're considering today does not 
necessarily reflect that this murder occurred in the presence 
of a child, so I'd ask that you find that aggravating factor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Hill. 
MS. HILL: And, your Honor, I'm just putting this 
together now because we've learned of it this morning, the 
additions the State was going to make. You know, looking at 
the aggravating factor, I know it's the two children we're 
specifically looking at. I know there was the adult standing 
with him so it could include him. I don't think we would 
have -- I don't have a basis for an objection on that because 
there were other children present. 
THE COURT: I think it's fair. Given the fact he 
drove into a church parking lot at a time when he knew people 
would be coming with their families to church and children 
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1 would be present, I think it's fair. Let me look back and see 
2 what pages we would reference. 
3 MR. STURGILL: Judge, page 2. 
4 THE COURT: Page 2? 
5 MR. STURGILL: On page 2 under the leisure and 
6 recreation subsection, the writer even acknowledges it. He 
7 says an aggravating factor in this offense is the fact that two 
8 young children watched the defendant shoot his wife. 
9 THE COURT: Oh, there it is. So it's there, but it's 
10 not in the actual factual summary. Okay. So I'm going to put 
11 a No. 2 next to that for page 2 and I will initial that as 
12 well. 
13 Anything else, Mr. Sturgill? 
14 MR. STURGILL: Judge, I think we'll leave it at that. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Did the defense have any 
16 corrections to be made to this? 
17 MS. HILL: We did not, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Then if the parties are 
19 ready, I'm just going to explain to the audience when I come in 
2 0 that we have dealt with some legal matters outside of their 
21 hearing. We've made some corrections to the presentence report 
22 after arguments and my ruling and then we'll go forward. 
23 MR. JOHNSON: Judge, I don't know if I need to speak 
24 in a mike. I just received information that three more people 
25 would like to speak. 
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THE COURT: And who are they? 
MR. JOHNSON: Aaron Wigington. 
THE COURT: He's the father? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. The other two are neighbors, 
Samantha Hollister and Karla Hall, family friends and 
neighbors. I have not talked to them. I will go out and speak 
with them as well as the other neighbors. 
THE COURT: Okay. This is not going to become 
sacrament meeting and this is not going to become an 
excoriation of the defendant. 
MR. STURGILL: If we just have a few minutes, we 
might be able to save some time. 
MS. HILL: Real quickly, your Honor. I was going 
to -- we were going to request credit for time served. I don't 
know if there's any objection to that. 
MR. STURGILL: No. 
MS. HILL: I think he's entitled to it. 
MR. STURGILL: Yeah, I think he's entitled to it by 
statute. 
THE COURT: And I make the recommendation. I can't 
give it to him. I can just recommend that the Board of Pardons 
give it to him. 
MR. KAWAI: Judge, is that something you want us to 
raise in court? 
THE COURT: No, I've got it in my notes. I've got it 
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1 on a page I didn't give to you. And the way I calculated 
2 related it we've got 365 days for the first year which took him 
3 January 6th through January 6th and another 24 days which adds 
4 up to 3 89 days, okay? 
5 MR. STURGILL: This might sound petty, Judge, but I 
6 think part of the concern that I had or we've had with - or I 
7 guess the concern that Jamie Wigington has had is that she 
8 doesn't feel like her children are really being recognized and 
9 accounted for and so if there' s anything you could say that 
10 would --
11 THE COURT: I'm going to make some comments at the 
12 end. And I intend to talk about the fact what I just said that 
13 he came into that parking lot knowing that families would be 
14 there and that these children are harmed. 
15 MR. STURGILL: That would mean a lot. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let Jennie know as 
17 soon as you're ready. We'll go off the record. 
18 (The following proceedings were held in open court.) 
19 THE COURT: This is the matter of the State of Utah, 
20 plaintiff, versus David Ragsdale, defendant. This is our file 
21 No. 081400235. 
22 Counsel, would you put your appearances on the 
23 record. 
24 MR. JOHNSON: Craig Johnson State of Utah. 
25 MR. STURGILL: Dave Sturgill on behalf of the State. 
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MR. KAWAI: Your Honor, Dusty Kawai, Andy Howell and 
Debbie Hill for Mr. Ragsdale. 
THE COURT: And I note Mr. Ragsdale is here as well. 
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for waiting. We have 
dealt with a number of legal issues in my chambers. We have 
made some corrections after arguments made to me with regard to 
the presentence report and I have made those changes on the 
presentence report and have initialed that report and the 
amended report will go up to the Board of Pardons. 
I just have a few words I'd like to say before we 
start today. The defendant has previously entered a guilty 
plea to a criminal homicide aggravated murder, a non-capital 
first-degree felony, at which time the parties stipulated to a 
sentence of an indeterminate term of not less than 2 0 years and 
which may be for life. In other words, the possibility of 
parole, but no guarantee of parole. 
The attorneys for both parties conferred with me in 
chambers several days before the defendant entered his plea of 
guilty, explained the agreement between the parties and 
informed me that the victims and their families had been 
involved in the discussions and had approved the agreement. 
They answered my questions in a very frank and open discussion 
of this matter. At the conclusion of that discussion I agreed 
to be bound by their agreement. 
At the time Mr. Ragsdale entered his plea, and that 
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was on November 26th, 2008, the plea agreement was fully 
explained on the record and I questioned Mr. Ragsdale very 
carefully before he entered his plea as to his understanding of 
what the sentence in this matter would be. He indicated to me 
very clearly and he understood that he would be sentenced to 
prison for at the very least 2 0 years and that he could 
possibly be in prison for the rest of his life. He also 
indicated that he understood that although he had spoken with 
various experts who had indicated how long he might spend at 
the prison, no one could guarantee what the Board of Pardons 
would ultimately decide in that respect. 
He understood that the final decision would be up to 
the Board of Pardons. Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, we are 
here today for a sentencing hearing in which the outcome is 
already known to all. I will sentence Mr. Ragsdale to an 
indeterminate term of not less than 20 years in the Utah State 
Prison and which also may be for life at the end of this 
hearing. 
Nevertheless, I am very interested in what you have 
to say to me today and I will listen very carefully. I will 
allow the defendant to make his presentation first, then the 
State and then any last words from the defendant. 
Mr. Kawai. 
MR. KAWAI: Your Honor, would you prefer me to stay 
at the table? 
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THE COURT: We will have a better record if you're at 
the podium. And I would ask any other speakers to come to the 
podium. 
MR. KAWAI: Judge, thank you for accommodating Mr. 
Ragsdale's medical issues that he had yesterday. And we're 
grateful you were able to accommodate those today and also --
THE COURT: Would you take the microphone up a little 
higher. Thank you. 
MR. KAWAI: -- and also because particularly that the 
Palizzis had flown in from Washington. We are grateful that 
you were able to accommodate their schedule as well. 
Judge, I and our defense team, Mr. Howell and Ms. 
Hill, we were assigned to Mr. Ragsdale in July of 2008, so it's 
been roughly seven months that we've been working with him. 
It's been shortly over a year that this tragedy occurred. When 
we first met David, I honestly didn't know how we were going to 
go about resolving this case. And I think this Court was able 
to make its own observations at the time of the preliminary 
hearing as to his demeanor, his attitude. I just want to tell 
you, your Honor, and particularly the Palizzis who are also in 
the courtroom that from the time that we met Mr. Ragsdale about 
two months into it I particularly saw a huge change in his 
heart. He went from being defiant, he had excuses for the 
actions that occurred, wasn't taking responsibility for those 
actions, and that changed over the two month period of time to 
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1 where when I would visit with David, I personally would feel 
2 the gravity of his pain and the remorse for his actions. 
3 I have personally witnessed him weep for the loss of 
4 Kristy, weep for the pain that he's caused to Ann and Al and 
5 their boys, weep for the pain that he's caused for his own two 
6 sons, Brandon and Carter. And it was at that time when 1 saw 
7 his heart change, that I knew or I had hope we were able to 
8 resolve this matter. And that resolution we are hopeful and 
9 David is hopeful will bring closure, at least some closure to 
10 the Palizzi family, help the parties move on in their lives. 
11 David knows that what he did on the 6th of January 2 008 he can 
12 never replace what he took away. He knows that the family 
13 members of the Palizzis will have to live with that loss 
14 forever. I know he will be living with that loss forever. 
15 David is a broken man for his choices that he made on that day. 
16 Your Honor, there has been talk of the medication 
17 that he was on. We had Dr. Pablo Stewart do evaluations of 
18 that medication. And it is his medical opinion that the high 
19 dosages of the multiple medications that he was on that day 
2 0 greatly contributed to that. That's not a legal defense. 
21 There were no legal defenses that we could make because of that 
22 information. It's not an excuse for his actions. Many people 
23 are on high dosages of medications and don't do the horrible 
24 acts that David did, but I look at what happened on the 6th of 
25 January, 2008, and it just seems like there was a storm 
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brewing. That storm was exacerbated by the medications that 
David was on, and it's just a tragedy as to what happened. 
I personally, Mr. Howell and Ms. Hill, we've all seen 
that change in his heart to where he has taken full 
responsibility for his actions. We're grateful that we were 
able to resolve this case for him and for the Palizzis and 
that's all I have to say about this. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have anybody else that 
wants to speak? 
MR. KAWAI: I think Mr. Ragsdale would like to say 
some words. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ragsdale, would you come 
up to the podium. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'd like to read a statement, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: That's fine. Why don't we adjust the 
microphone for him. 
THE DEFENDANT: I would like to express my deep 
remorse and sorrow for the terrible act that I've committed. 
There is no way I can apologize in a manner that can be 
satisfactory to those who have been affected by my horrific 
action. To say that I'm sorry seems far to weak to attempt the 
lack of the woman I promised to spend eternity with. I 
essentially orphaned my children. I forever gave my family a 
black eye, not to mention taking away a son and a brother. 
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I've caused incalculable hurt and loss to Kristi's family. How 
any of these people will ever be able to forgive me is beyond 
me. In committing the most terrible of all crimes I have 
severely hurt everyone that I truly care about. 
I want you to know that I am confident that I would 
not have taken Kristi's life had I not been on the medications 
that I was on. That being said, I take full responsibility for 
my actions. I made my own terrible decisions and I cannot 
blame anybody but myself. I am deeply sorry to everyone but 
mostly to my dear wife Kristy whose life was cut short unfairly 
I can never make amends for what I've done and I hope that 
sometime in this life or the next that I can obtain forgiveness 
for everyone that I've hurt. 
I want Ann and Al to know that I love my boys Brandon 
and Carter with all my heart and that I miss them so much. And 
I want to thank you from the bottom of my heart for taking such 
good care of them and I know that they are in good hands. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. KAWAI: Your Honor, I believe that the Ragsdale 
family also has a short statement they'd like me to read. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ragsdale, if you'd like, 
you can sit down. 
MR. KAWAI: Your Honor, Ted and Judy Ragsdale are 
present in the courtroom and they've asked on behalf of their 
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family, the Ragsdale family, that I make this statement. 
When we speak to our son David, it would be 
-impossible for us to overstate the grief Dave feels and 
expresses about the terrible act he committed. He will have to 
bear that pain forever. We have to live with it. Our hearts 
go out to Kristi's family. We are sorry. Our thoughts now 
turn to their children and it is our prayer that they will know 
their parents love for them. Our focus now should be on them. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Anything else 
from the defense at this point? 
MR. KAWAI: No, your Honor . 
THE COURT: Thank you. From the State. 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge, there are a handful of people 
who would like to address the Court. After that, the State 
will make a few remarks, but if we can first hear from Ann 
Palizzi. 
THE COURT: All right. Mrs. Palizzi, will you please 
come forward. 
MS. PALIZZI: Thank you, Judge Laycock, for giving me 
this opportunity to speak. 
THE COURT: Could you spell your name for the court 
reporter? 
MS. PALIZZI: Sure. Ann, A-n-n, Palizzi, 
P-a-1-i-z-z-i. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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1 MS. PALIZZI: I've thought of what I would want to 
2 say for a full year now, and it's come to me that I need to 
3 represent the voice of Kristy. And these are taken from some 
4 of her personal writings and her journal and her personal 
5 conversations that we've had. As a mother, when Kristy met 
6 Dave, my mother's intuition told me they were wrong for each 
7 other. And there's a saying that opposites attract, but in 
8 this situation the opposites were too great. So they were 
9 really wrong from the very beginning because there were too 
10 many differences. Kristy was a social butterfly who loved to 
11 play and Dave was more of a recluse who liked to hold his 
12 secrets. He didn't like to take vacations. He was more 
13 regimented and structured. He worked hard. 
14 Kristy was very fun and spontaneous. She loved to 
15 spend his money and he liked to save his money. Kristy was 
16 very very service oriented and Dave was more self oriented. 
17 Kristy wanted a spiritual life and Dave wanted a life of the 
18 world. Kristy was very very random in her personality and 
19 Dave -- I think that kicked in his OCD and his anxiety because 
2 0 she was so random. I knew they were wrong from the beginning 
21 and this is one time that I really hoped that I was wrong. She 
22 made me choose between Dave or her. She told me that I would 
23 have to accept David into her life if I wanted a relationship 
24 with her. And so I did. I accepted him as a son and I put my 
25 around him and I would love him. 
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We trusted him to take care of our daughter. He has 
betrayed us in the most critical way of trust. Kristy really 
wanted more than anything unconditional love and acceptance and 
that's something Dave couldn't give her and it's because they 
were such opposites. I don't think Dave ever learned that the 
more he harassed her about something, the more she was 
determined to do the exact opposite. And as her mother, I 
learned that very quick that if I really tried to nail her on 
something, she's going to do the opposite, but I don't think 
Dave ever learned that. So I think they were in some ways two 
guilty people in the party as far as the relationship. 
The last year of her marriage became very very 
difficult for her. The verbal abuse and the emotional abuse 
was starting to escalate and through Dave's emotional abuse it 
almost killed Kristy's spirit. He started calling her the 
psycho bitch. And she finally in September went and started 
getting counseling. And as she got counseling, she started 
empowering herself. And when Dave would criticize her, she 
started throwing it right back in his face and telling him that 
those were his issues and she wasn't going to carry that 
anymore and she was not going to carry the guilt that he was 
trying to make her feel. 
I think that's when things really started escalating 
out of control, when she was no longer willing to carry his 
garbage and his baggage. She begged and begged for him to get 
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1 help, to get counseling, and he always said that she was the 
2 psycho bitch that had the problems and he had none, but I think 
3 we can now see that he did have problems, but he was in denial 
4 and would not accept the reality that he needed to get some 
5 help. 
6 I want to read you some of her writings. This will 
7 tell you the state of mind she was in. She wrote thoughts and 
8 ideas and they were sort of disjointed in some ways because she 
9 was putting down just a rough draft for writing lyrics. And 
10 the first one she wrote in September and she was -- it was --
11 the title of the song was Resuscitation. And she's begging and 
12 pleading for somebody to resuscitate her and give her the 
13 breath of life. And she just felt like she was smothering in 
14 toxicity, that she was drowning in toxicity. And she says I 
15 need a resuscitation. Now, I did not find these writings of 
16 hers until after her death when the police let me go into the 
17 house to find a photo to send to the mortician so he could do 
18 the reconstruction of her face. That was the first thing that 
19 I found. So in September she's feeling like she's drowning and 
2 0 she needed to breath and she's begging for someone to give her 
21 breath. 
22 Then in October she wrote this one. I think it's 
23 very profound because it tells you the state of mind Kristy was 
24 in. She was a fan of Grey's Anatomy so I think that affected 
25 it some and she entitled it Open Heart Surgery. Lying on the 
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table, cold room, losing consciousness, wake up to pain, 
darkness, cold, alone. Chest wide open. Where is everybody? 
Why am I left like this damaged, exposed? Is my heart missing 
or shredded to pieces? Where are the people to mend, to 
complete the surgery to heal my heart. I thought that' s what 
this was. I trusted them to go in and fix the problem and now 
I'm lying here too weak to scream for help, to scream out. You 
just can't leave me here to die. What crisis calls for leaving 
me on the table cold and exposed with my chest cut open and a 
missing heart. 
And when I read this, that was the description of her 
autopsy as the mortician told me about her autopsy. They did 
have her on a metal table in a cold room and she was cut into 
the chest so he could do the investigation into which organs 
had been affected. And her heart was shredded by the bullets. 
And so two and a half months before she died she wrote about 
her own autopsy. To me that's chilling, but that tells me the 
state of mind that she was in. 
I'm not saying that it was all Dave's creation, but I 
do want you to know that because of Kristy's personality, her 
personality was bigger than life. She did not die in a vacuum 
and quietly where people didn't notice that she died because 
she was bigger than life. Her relationships and her 
friendships were bigger than life. And we have heard from 40 
different states and we've heard around the globe of how this 
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1 has affected people. It's helped me to really realize how wide 
2 spread one person's action could affect so many people and the 
3 connectedness we have in a global community. 
4 We hear from total complete strangers who have been 
5 profoundly affected by this. What I'm hearing from them is 
6 they suffer from deep depression, anger and fear. And, Judge, 
7 I want to tell you thank you for not giving Dave bail. There 
8 were some people who were so angry that they told me they were 
9 ready to kill David. And I am so glad he didn't get out on 
10 bail because then there'd be another family involved in a 
11 crime. Dave stole the innocence of hundreds or maybe thousands 
12 of little children who now have to deal with the fact that it's 
13 a reality that daddy can kill mommy. 
14 There were many children in the church that day. 
15 They have nightmares. They have a lot of fear. There's a lot 
16 of fear in Kristy's neighborhood. There's 31 individuals who 
17 have either gotten their concealed weapon's license or in the 
18 process of getting it and that is a real small neighborhood of 
19 about three blocks, but those individuals feel like they never 
20 want to feel vulnerable again, that they don't have the 
21 capacity to protect their wife's and their children. The fact 
22 that they are taking action to get these concealed weapon 
23 permits tells me that those men are feeling fear. 
24 There's absolutely no words that are adequate for me 
25 to express the experience that I had and the feelings that I 
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had to see my daughter fall into the snow and see her crimson 
red blood just draining into that snow. It's a vivid memory 
that will live with me forever, but I think David's acts with 
the ultimate act of selfishness, did he ever consider all those 
children? How it would affect them? The children who 
witnessed that and that saw a bullet rip through Kristy's face? 
That's a memory that no four or eight year old should ever have 
to carry with them for the rest of their life. 
Did he ever consider Dr. Russell Rhodes who did the 
CPR and every time he'd give her a chest compression had 
Kristy's blood on her hand. Dr. Rhodes was her next door 
neighbor. Did he consider how it would affect those people 
giving CPR? Did he consider Robert Williams and the effect it 
would have on him and his family. He was the EMT that gave 
mouth to mouth resuscitation. Did he ever consider the police 
officers who had to work the scene and clean up that horrible 
bloody mess? A lot of them were rookies and this was the first 
really bad criminal experience they'd had to deal with and 
they've had to have counseling. Did he ever consider the 
coroner and the effect it would have on the coroner or the 
morticians who had to reconstruct Kristy's face and try to make 
it presentable for a funeral? 
And in his selfishness did he ever think of Kristy's 
family and her friends? And did he ever in his selfishness at 
the time consider how this would affect Brandon and Carter and 
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their nightmares and their fear? Little Brandon was four years 
old and he would ask me over and over is there a lock on the 
jail? I says Brandon there is. Is it locked on the inside or 
the outside, grandma? It's locked on the outside. So David 
can never get out. I says why do you ask me that, Brandon? 
And he said daddy yelled at and mommy and daddy killed mommy 
and daddy yelled at me and when he gets out, he will shoot me. 
That's a horrible fear for a little four year old to have to 
fear his own father. 
These little boys had their trust totally shattered 
that day, but we, myself, the therapist, have worked very hard 
to help these little boys learn to trust. And at this point in 
time they have learned to trust grandma. I will always tell 
them the truth. I will never try to hide facts from them 
because they need to know there is one person in this world 
that they can trust. These little boys feared and had a great 
sense of abandonment. And they had anxiety separation. And 
there were two or three months where I couldn' t even take a 
shower without them being right there with me because they were 
too afraid to have me out of their sight. 
I want David to know that as long as there's breath 
in this body that I will give his boys every opportunity for 
education, stability, structure. I will make sure they have 
educational opportunities to become professionals, that they 
will have integrity as their older brothers, my older sons. 
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And they will never have to lie to make a living. Sometimes I 
go and stand on the blood stains of Kristy's blood in the 
parking lot at the church and I vow to myself that I will never 
let the evilness of her death conquer me or my family. I am 
determined that righteousness will prevail over evilness in my 
family and particularly these two little boys. 
It seems like Dave was throwing a big tantrum that 
day. His behavior the last three months had been exactly like 
Brandon's who was four. It seemed like Dave was operating on a 
four year old's maturity level. And what the therapist told me 
to do with Brandon when he had a tantrum was give him time out 
in the red bathroom and not let him out. And I' m asking you to 
give Dave time out because that's what he needs for the tantrum 
that he has pulled. I personally have forgiven Dave and I have 
forgiven him early on. And it's because little Brandon and 
Carter deserve pure love. And if I hold bad feelings toward 
their father, I cannot love them in the purity that they 
deserve. 
And sometimes in the beginning when they would act 
like David, that would trigger my anger, but those little boys 
do not deserve to be held hostage for their father's behavior. 
I forgive Dave, but I'm not ready for reconciliation. I don't 
go to the bars or casinos or the penitentiary to find friends. 
I don't have enough time right now to do that because my focus 
is on my two little sons that need a hundred percent of my 
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And I want to conclude this with thanks to the media, 
to the community, the legal system, everyone who has been so 
gracious to our family. Utah community has been incredibly 
gracious to us and I'm very grateful for that. Thank you for 
your t ime. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Johnson. 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge, Jamie Wigington would like to 
address the Court. 
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Wigington. 
MR. STURGILL: Judge, this is Jamie Wigington. Her 
husband is Aaron. Would it be okay if they stood at the 
lecturn together? 
THE COURT: Sure. Sure. Come on up. 
So would you spell your last name. 
MS. WIGINGTON: W-i-g-i-n-g-t-o-n. 
THE COURT: Jamie and Aaron, A-a-r-o-n. 
MS. WIGINGTON: And J-a-m-i-e. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Go ahead. 
MS. WIGINGTON: First off it's really hard for me to 
hear David's statement or those who defend him how sorry he is 
because I don't feel it undoes anything that was done. 
I'm glad that he's sorry or that he says he's sorry, 
but like Ann said it's affected so many people and my husband 
and my two boys were the ones who were the witnesses that were 
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so close to those bullets and I was home with my daughter and 
my four month old baby. I got a knock at the door and a 
neighbor was there and I saw all these cars driving around and 
something just didn't feel right and she said, Jamie, something 
horrible has happened. And immediately I thought it's my 
family. And she said they were okay, but it's Kristy. She's 
been shot and she's gone. And I knew Kristy. She was my 
neighbor. She was my friend. I had my friend Allie come in 
and sit with me while I waited to find my family. 
My boys were with my husband at the church and so I 
waited for about a hour until they brought my boys back and my 
husband had to stay to give his statement. And they said that 
when they got there, they were walking to the church and a man, 
my four-year-old said a man shot a lady and she fell to the 
ground and he said I thought I was going to die. And my 
husband brought them into the church and he went back out to 
see if he could help and they were bawling and scared and they 
thought he was going out and he was going to die. 
And so they sat in the church crying hoping he would 
come back. And so they were just terrified. My eight-year-old 
understood more. He saw the gun. He saw what happened and he 
understood more, but he was still terrified. My four-year-old 
has since -- he's five now, but he's always talking about the 
black policemen because Dave was wearing dark clothing and he's 
terrified of the black policemen. He has nightmares about the 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
1 black policemen. If we hear policemen or hear sirens, it just 
2 brings it back to him and he's terrified. 
3 I was with my friends at lunch and there were some 
4 policemen and I went up to them and I said do you think you 
5 could say something to him so that he would know that the 
6 policemen are good and that this man was not a policemen. I'm 
7 sorry. 
8 THE COURT: It's okay. 
9 MS. WIGINGTON: And so they did speak to him. We've 
10 tried as much as we can to get him to realize that policemen 
11 are good and we're still working with him. Our eight-year-old 
12 every single night when we put him to bed he asked can dad 
13 sleep downstairs tonight, every single night since this 
14 happened. And sometimes he will and most of the time he comes 
15 upstairs because we need to try to get back to normal, but he's 
16 scared. He doesn't want to sleep in his room alone. 
17 He has affected so many people. He doesn't realize. 
18 When it happened, Aaron's mom was terrified. Her son could 
19 have been shot. My mom could have lost her grandchildren. So 
2 0 our number one priority is try to make our boys feel safe again 
21 which is so hard. So when he says he's sorry, nothing else 
22 matters. He did what he did. And I am grateful that he's 
23 being punished and that he will be in prison so people can feel 
24 safe because. If he was out, I wouldn't feel safe. 
25 I am grateful for the People who have worked on the 
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case and I do feel like this is a good choice. It's been hard 
for me throughout the process, because my kids were so 
involved, wishing that there was more that could be done 
because the truth is nothing would be good enough because 
nothing can change what happened. He's changed our lives 
forever and the lives of our neighborhood and the community and 
that can't be undone. 
And that's all I have to say. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. WIGINGTON: I'd like to just take a moment, I 
don't know if it's possible for a man that I've never met 
before to have the biggest affect on my life that I'll probably 
ever have from anybody else. That day me and my two boys 
walked into church. Dave Ragsdale passed us in his car and a 
couple feet away was Kristy. And we saw his car stop. And we 
continued walk into church and heard the first gunshot and 
looked over and took a minute to register what was happening. 
At that moment my two boys saw the fear in my face, my eyes, 
and we started to run as fast as we can. And for two little 
boys to keep up with me, I don't know if their feet touched the 
ground or not. 
As I passed them off to another lady walking into the 
church yelling at her to call 911, I returned back out to 
Kristy's body. Another gentleman was already out there. We 
rolled her over and saw the bullet holes. I proceeded to go 
L 
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1 out and get my car mats from my car to give her something warm 
2 to lay on other than the cold asphalt. As I got back, there 
3 was a couple more gentlemen out there and they started giving 
4 her CPR. And hearing that air exit her lungs as it rattled is 
5 something that I'll never get over. I'll hear it every once in 
6 a while. Hearing a lady offer a prayer out to God behind me 
7 that her body may be taken is something I'll never get over. 
8 I'll have moments where I'll be fine and then something will 
9 pop into my mind and then it starts the chain reaction all over 
10 again. 
11 After half an hour being out there with Kristy's 
12 body, they allowed me to go back into the church to get my two 
13 boys. And the hardest thing for me that whole day was seeing 
14 the fear in their eyes as they looked up at me and they said I 
15 didn't know if you were coming back. And my eight year old had 
16 written down on a piece of paper trying to reassure himself, he 
17 wrote down in big letters is dad dead? And big letters he 
18 wrote no. And he handed me that and I didn't know how to 
19 address that. And it was and has affected our lives in ways I 
20 never thought possible. 
21 He still does have nightmares. That first night 
22 sleeping down there he'd wake up and make sure I was still 
23 there with him. It is something that will forever mold the two 
24 boys into men. Hopefully through me and my wife we can help 
25 guide that a little better, but it's something that's affected 
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them to their core. In their video statements they've given 
hearing them say that they were in fear of their lives. It was 
something a little bit nerve racking that a father should hear 
their kids being in fear for their lives. 
Fathers are supposed to protect their kids and 
there' s no way I could have protected them from that. And I do 
appreciate all the stuff that the Lehi Police Department has 
done for us. Neighbors have been wonderful and we've really 
bound together as a neighborhood and a community and I 
appreciate your time and efforts into this case and that's it. 
Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge, I was made aware earlier that 
there were four other individuals who wanted to make a 
statement. Mr. Sturgill and I spoke with them before this 
hearing and if I could just inquire to see if they would like 
to make a statement. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge, Terri Hunter would like to first 
be heard and then Samantha Hollister. 
THE COURT: All right. Is it Terry with an i or y? 
MS. HUNTER: T-e-r-r-i, H-u-n-t-e-r. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. HUNTER: I'll be brief. I'm sorry. There are 
many silent broken hearts that are not here today because they 
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1 couldn't take coming and that includes my home with my eight 
2 kids. Struggling with fear, anger and also compassion. Our 
3 lives were changed by this single act. My children have 
4 learned a new fear. They fear the loss of their mother. The 
5 anger of my ex-husband, the loss of safety and their place of 
6 spiritual learning. My children struggle with separation 
7 anxiety also. There are many people whom David Ragsdale has no 
8 idea whose lives have been changed. This act caused me 
9 ultimately to quit my 9 year career as an ER nurse. 
10 I was also blessed this year to be able to spend a 
11 lot of time with Brandon and Carter helping Ann. They were in 
12 my home and I observed Brandon light up as he would participate 
13 with our family, especially participate in my motherly acts to 
14 my children. I would rock Carter and he would look into my 
15 eyes as if he was looking through me and something far past me. 
16 I've watched as they've clung to their grandmother for safety 
17 and security. There's much comfort knowing that they will be 
18 raised in a home of love with music and good values. My pain 
19 is not for Kristy. I know she's okay. It's for those boys. 
20 It's for Kristy's family, her parents. It's for our young ones 
21 in our neighborhood. It's for the little children. It's for 
22 my children. 
23 My young child brought home a journal from school 
24 just this last month with a picture of a lady that died at our 
25 church who was shot last year. This is definitely impacted a 
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lot of people and a lot of lives. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. JOHNSON: Samantha Hollister. 
THE COURT: Okay. Would you spell your last name. 
MS. HOLLISTER: H-o-l-l-i-s-t-e-r. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. HOLLISTER: Thank you for this opportunity. My 
husband and I moved to Utah from the LA area mostly for the 
reason that we wanted to live someplace that was safe and that 
was family friendly. We lived across the street from Kristy. 
I became good friends with her. When I saw the sad side of 
Kristy, I knew there was a burden and a hurt behind those eyes. 
I feel tremendous guilt that I didn't know how serious it was 
and how bad it was getting. Although toward the end we became 
increasingly aware because it was hard to hide. 
On the morning that Kristy was murdered my husband 
was sick and I went to church with my daughter. And as I drove 
up in our truck, Dave was leaving in a car right as we were 
entering the parking lot, and as I drove by that spot where 
Kristy had just fallen, it had just happened and I didn't know 
what had happened and so I parked and all I know is that a 
woman had fallen in the snow and was bleeding and needed help. 
So I'd taken off my coat and put it under her head so that 
those working on her --so she would be comforted and that 
maybe she could possibly be resuscitated, but she was gone. I 
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1 would learn later that she was -- there was no chance of her 
2 coming up from that. 
3 I have to tell you that every snowy Sunday morning 
4 when I go to church, I can still picture her there in that spot 
5 and I don't want to remember her that way, but I do. She is 
6 such a beautiful, wonderful, giving person and she didn't 
7 deserve that. It's such a public place. My husband is angry 
8 about it because he thinks s what if you had gotten there a few 
9 seconds sooner, you could have been in the middle of that. And 
10 you go through the what ifs, you know, what if, because I park 
11 normally right where she was shot. 
12 There has been some good that has come through that 
13 experience. I know that we as a neighborhood, we look after 
14 one another more. We take each other more seriously. When 
15 there is problems, we don't take each other for granted. We 
16 check in on each other. For that I'm grateful. I know that at 
17 night -- I have a daughter who is the same age as Carter and 
18 they would play together. I know that at night when I look 
19 down on her holding her before I put her into bed that I am so 
20 much more grateful that I have her, that I can raise her, that 
21 I have that blessing that I take for granted, can be taken away 
22 at any time if someone chooses to take that away from me. 
23 There's nothing I can do, but I am blessed to stay here and 
24 have my daughter I can raise and that' s an opportunity Kristy 
25 will never have. And my heart breaks for that because I'm so 
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grateful to be a mother and I know she loved being a mother. 
I just wanted to make it known that this definitely 
has impacted so many people. I'm just one of many people that 
aren't here today telling you how much she was loved, how much 
she impacted us for good and how much she'll be missed. And 
there is fear. I'm grateful that Dave received -- did not 
receive bail. I'm grateful that I don't have to worry right 
now that he's walking the streets because I know a lot of 
people would be afraid to go to church, to be in our 
neighborhood, and I don't think people should have to worry 
about that after what we have been through. 
My husband is one of those people that has decided to 
get his concealed weapon's permit. He's angry and upset and 
there was nothing he could do to prevent this, but I know he 
doesn't ever want us to go through anything like that again and 
if that helps us to gain a little bit of power and a little bit 
of sanity back, I think that's what he's trying to do and I 
don't blame him. But I am grateful for the example Ann has 
been to me and her family of strength in this terrible, 
terrible situation. I'm grateful for all the people that have 
helped us to try and work through it as best as we can. And 
I'm grateful for this opportunity to speak today. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge, the last person that would like 
to speak would be Matt Soren, a relative of Kristy. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Would you spell your last 
2 name. 
3 MR. SOREN: S-o-r-e-n. 
4 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
5 MR. SOREN: Thank you for letting me have the 
6 opportunity to get up here, your Honor. 
7 I decided to come up on behalf of my wife and her 
8 sister whom are cousins of Kristy. They don't have the --
9 there's a lot of people that wanted to say things and just 
10 don't -- actually didn't even feel like they could come. We 
11 weren't at the scene of the accident. We weren't there. We've 
12 been close to Kristy, you know, we're her family, but it 
13 affected us. Especially my wife and her sister so much more. 
14 I mean, something like that affected us so much more than I 
15 would have expected or expected that it could or anticipate. 
16 Our children, of course, we couldn't hide it from them. And I 
17 know our children weren't there, but they fear for their lives 
18 and safety. It kind of turned things around because we've been 
19 to their home for Christmas. Kristy always pulled her family 
2 0 together, you know, the other side of her family. And she was 
21 at every family gathering. And there's a lot of things going 
22 through my mind, things I wish I could have done for her before 
23 this happened. You know, we tried to help them. 
24 Children afterwards were constantly afraid, you know, 
25 both of our children kept wanting to make sure the doors were 
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locked, wanted to make sure Dave couldn't get out of prison. 
They were afraid he would come and kill them. Actually we had 
a little bit of that fear too because we tried to make sure we 
could support her and help her from the situation before this 
happened and to try to have -- try to rebuild stability in our 
family to help them understand that this isn't right. It's 
wrong. This shouldn't happen. And to help them have the 
stability back in their home, to know that they are safe with 
us and that, you know, even though a father could do that to a 
mother, that it's not normal and show them everything we can to 
show increase in love and safety. 
I mean, my sisters --my wife has had struggle with 
depression, counseling. A lot of things that have gone on that 
is making us -- it's strengthening us. We're just grateful for 
the police department and all the people that have been so 
supportive. We're just grateful for everything that has been 
done and we do want to thank you for that. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, your Honor, for your 
indulgence. That's all the statements we have. If I can just 
comment on a few things. As you can see, Judge, it's no secret 
there's many victims here. The people that have spoken today 
represent a larger body. Others that you've heard from at the 
preliminary hearing, the Wiggins, the Dukes. Talked about 
Kristy's children who Ann is raising. Think about this Sunday 
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morning. The whole ward they were part of that were starting 
church. The neighborhood that's rallied around. This has 
really affected a whole community. 
Lehi city, Utah county, it's been widely publicized. 
And as you've heard, the response Ann has gotten from across 
the United States of America and the world via the internet. 
It has had a profound effect, but this is really a day to focus 
on the life of Kristy, that Kristy led. She would have been 31 
now. Her birthday would have been little more than three weeks 
ago. This horrific act occurred on her 30th birthday in front 
of her mother at the beginning of sacrament meeting in the 
church parking lot where she went and attended, the ultimate 
sanctuary. 
Kristy was a mother, a daughter, a sister, a cousin, 
a neighbor. She affected so many people. And all that was 
robbed from us on January 6th. The defendant -- Mr. Kawai 
talks about the medications, how they contributed, talked about 
the report that's cited in the PSI, but this wasn't a snap 
decision, your Honor. The PSI also references to the 
protective order that was granted in early December. At that 
time it was as a result of a comment about the defendant 
bringing a gun to Kristy's house and that his brother and 
sister were present. You heard about neighbors and Ann's view 
of the de-escalation of their relationship for months 
beforehand. I personally listened to all the jail phone calls 
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that are referred to in the PSI and can see the defendant's 
lack of remorse up to the time that Mr. Kawai talked about 
right after the killing. 
We talk about victims. We also talk about Jamie and 
Aaron Wigington and their two boys. Jamie got up and mentioned 
that they were witnesses to this. They weren't just witnesses, 
they were victims. They were approximately 20 feet away from 
where Kristy was shot in the line of fire and a bullet was 
lodged in the radiator of the van they had just passed by not 2 
or 3 feet away. It was a miracle they were not shot in the 
crossfire. 
As these 12 bullets whizzed through Kristy throughout 
this parking lot, crowded parking lot, the beginning of 
sacrament meeting, it's a miracle there aren't more people that 
were directly injured or even killed. And it's because of 
their proximity and Ann's that the State was able to pursue the 
aggravating factor in this case. Otherwise, it would have been 
a straight murder case. Sentencing difference, as the Court 
knows, is the difference between 15 and life and 20 to life, 
but it's more than that. The aggravating language is on the 
charge that he pled guilty to and will be before the Board of 
Pardons and that, we believe, will be significant in their 
decision of whether or not to parole Mr. Ragsdale at any time. 
We hope that the Palizzis and the Wigingtons and 
their children and all those who were affected by this will 
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1 continue to heal through the years old, but this, as you heard, 
2 is not going to be a simple fix. State also hopes that the 
3 Board of Pardons will never release the defendant. We believe 
4 this is the proper plea and sentence under the circumstances. 
5 This will bring a tremendous amount of closure to these 
6 families. And we ask the Court adopt the agreed upon 
7 resolution and send Mr. Ragsdale to prison today. Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Kawai? 
9 MR. KAWAI: No, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Counsel, could I just have 
11 two of you from each side come up. I have a question. 
12 (Off the record,) 
13 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to make 
14 just a few comments before I sentence the defendant. I think 
15 there's very little that I can say that will add to what has 
16 been said with great eloquence today by the People who have 
17 spoken to me. I remember the facts from the preliminary 
18 hearing very clearly. This was literally one moment of 
19 incalculable cruelty and selfishness on Mr. Ragsdale's part. 
20 And it's going to have lifelong consequences of an extremely 
21 serious nature for dozens of people. 
22 My greatest concern is for a rather limited set of 
23 people. I have great concern for the Ragsdale children. These 
24 two boys are going to be raised in a wonderful home with their 
25 grandparents and they are going to have all those advantages 
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there. And I'm confident that the Palizzis are going to do 
everything they can to bring these children up in what will 
feel as much as possible to be a normal home with all the 
normal advantages they could have had in their own home with 
their mother and father. But nevertheless these children have 
to deal with the loss of both parents, and for the rest of 
their lives they will have to explain why they lost their 
mother when they were very young and where their father is. 
And they will have to deal with that in a manner that I hope 
will -- I know will be aided by their grandparents and their 
family, but I just can't imagine two little boys having to grow 
up with that burden placed upon them. 
I also have great concern for the two Wigington boys 
who through no fault of their own were exposed to something 
that I suspect their parents don't even let them watch on TV. 
And for them, having heard their parents today and having also 
read the letters that were submitted to the Court, this has 
been a horrific experience from which they are not recovering 
with any great speed and it's no surprise. 
I also have great concern for Mrs. Palizzi. She's 
about my age and I cannot imagine how painful it would be to 
watch your son-in-law gun down your only daughter and to relive 
that as she explained in her letter to me. I don't know how 
you could not relive that like she still does. And I also have 
concerns for Mr. Palizzi and the rest of that family who lost 
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1 their daughter and sister. It's going to be a lifetime of 
2 recovery for them. I also have great concern for Mr. 
3 Wigington who held his two boys hands and ran after they 
4 observed this murder. And Mrs. Wigington who is dealing with 
5 the aftereffects even though she wasn't there. 
6 We have a small group of people here who are 
7 suffering incalculable pain because of something Mr. Ragsdale 
8 did. I understand the claims about the various psychotropic 
9 drugs that he was prescribed and using, but as I view the 
10 evidence from the preliminary hearing and what I've heard today 
11 that gave me added details that I didn't even get at that 
12 hearing, it's very clear to me that regardless of whatever 
13 prescription drugs he was taking, he knew very well what he was 
14 doing. 
15 The testimony was from several people that they saw 
16 him sitting in his BMW on the south side of the church, as I 
17 recall it was the south side of the church, and they passed 
18 him. They saw the car. It's very clear to me he was there. 
19 He waited until he saw his wife drive past. From the vantage 
2 0 point he would have certainly known that his mother-in-law was 
21 in the car with her. He watched them drive past. He went into 
22 the parking lot of the church. He went around until he found 
23 them. It didn't take long. He stepped out of the car and 
24 without a word, in probably less than a minute, emptied the gun 
25 into his wife. I am convinced he knew exactly what he was 
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doing. 
Now, whether or not he was taking drugs, whether or 
not he planned this for a day or for a half hour, he understood 
exactly what he was doing. He may not have understood all the 
ramifications and how it would hurt all the people that have 
spoken to me and the countless others who have not spoken to me 
today, but he knew what he was doing. 
As I indicated at the beginning, I spoke to the 
attorneys. I understood the reasons for the plea agreement and 
I agreed to be bound by that. And I will follow that agreement 
today. I think it was an appropriate resolution. I think it 
dealt with concerns from both parties; the families, the 
victims the witnesses, the extended victims, so I have no 
quarrel with how either side has resolved this matter today. 
I think that the sentence I am about to impose is 
appropriate. I leave in the hands of the Board of Pardons, 
because legally I can do no other thing, how long he stays 
there. That is their decision. And much of what we have done 
today is for the benefit of the Board of Pardons. 
Mr. Ragsdale and Mr. Kawai, would you come up to the 
podium. On November 25th, Mr. Ragsdale, you entered a plea of 
guilty to Count 1, aggravated murder, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 76-5-202 in that you on or about January 6th, 
2008, in Utah County, Utah, did intentionally or knowingly 
cause the death of your wife, Kristy Ragsdale, and that you 
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knowingly created a great risk of death to a person, in this 
case three other people, other than the victim, your wife, and 
yourself. 
Pursuant to statute I know sentence you to an 
indeterminate term of not less than 20 years in the Utah State 
Prison which may also be for life. I make a recommendation to 
the Board of Pardons with regard to credit for time served as 
follows: As I calculated, and as the attorneys agreed with me, 
it would be a total of 389 days. As I indicated, that's a 
recommendation. In the end it's their determination as to 
whether or not that credit is actually applied to your 
sentence. 
I agree with the recommendation of Adult Probation 
and Parole that while you're incarcerated you should involve 
yourself in any mental health therapy that's offered at the 
Utah State Prison. With regard to the issue of restitution, it 
is my understanding that through the civil lawsuit that the 
restitution with regard to the Estate of Kristy and for the 
benefit of the children has been taken care of. Is that 
correct, Mr. Kawai? 
MR. KAWAI: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Johnson? 
MR. JOHNSON: That's the State's understanding, 
Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. And I would indicate for the 
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record that the case was also assigned to me and I have signed 
off on the settlement documents in that case. With regard to 
the restitution for the Wigington family and therapy for their 
children, I'm going to leave that issue open for a period of 60 
days for the County Attorney's Office to research that issue. 
And if they want, they can submit a motion and proposed order 
to Mr. Kawai and the defense team and we'll take it from there. 
If there's an objection, we'll have a hearing. Otherwise, if 
it's stipulated, I would go ahead and sign that order and 
forward that to the Board of Pardons. So I will reserve 
jurisdiction to deal with that further issue of possible 
restitution. 
With that counsel, is there anything that I've 
missed? 
MR. JOHNSON: I think you got it all, Judge. 
MR. KAWAI: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. With that I remand the 
defendant back to the custody of the Utah Sheriff's -- Utah 
County Sheriff's Office for transportation to the Utah State 
Prison. Thank you very much, Counsel. Thank you to all of 
those who have spoken. We'll be in recess. 
(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.) 
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